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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The present study investigated the relationship between object-based attention and visual 
short-term memory (VSTM). Three claims were investigated: (a) spatial attention and spatial 
STM share similar processing resources; (b) object-based attention and object STM share 
similar processing resources; and (c) both sets of processing resources are dissociable. 
Although the first claim is well established, the latter two claims are less established due to 
limited empirical evidence in the literature. Specifically, studies that provided evidence for 
the latter two claims (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008) employed an object-based 
attention task (Duncan, 1984) with no spatial component that heavily engaged object STM. 
These issues were addressed in the present study using a dual-task paradigm with different 
combinations of attention tasks and memory tasks. The different attention tasks used could 
engage spatial attention, object-based attention, or both. Similarly, the different memory 
tasks used could engage spatial STM, object STM or both. Experiment 1 was designed to 
address the issue of a lack of spatial component in the object-based attention task by 
including a spatial version of the object-based attention task used in previous studies. The 
results in Experiment 1 were consistent with all three claims that were investigated. 
Experiment 2 was designed to address the issue of heavy engagement of object STM by the 
object-based attention task by using a different object-based attention task (Egly et al., 1994). 
The results in Experiment 2 were not entirely consistent with all three claims. Specifically, 
while there was some support for the first two claims, the third claim was not supported. 
Overall, the findings in the present study suggest that the interaction between object-based 
 ix 
attention and VSTM is complex and further studies are required to fully describe the 
relationship. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
When one engages the environment to perform a task, the visual system usually needs 
to select the task relevant visual information over the task irrelevant visual information. This 
is because the amount of visual information that is available to an individual at any moment 
of time is more than what the visual system can handle (Tsotsos, 1990). Hence, in order to 
prevent the visual system from becoming overloaded, it is crucial that the system selects task 
relevant information. The cognitive mechanism responsible for the selection of task relevant 
visual information over task irrelevant information is visual selective attention (e.g., Johnston 
& Dark, 1986; Pashler, 1998).  
When the task in question is complex and requires several stages, it is common for 
visual information selected at an earlier stage of the task to be employed in the later stage of 
the task. Hence, it is necessary for the cognitive system to maintain the relevant visual 
information temporarily in a highly accessible state in order for the information to be stored 
and processed simultaneously, which will allow the manipulation of visual information for 
the completion of the concurrent task. For example, when one is trying to locate one’s 
current position on a map, one needs to temporarily maintain visual and spatial information 
of the surrounding environment (e.g., surrounding landmarks and their spatial relationship), 
and then manipulate and transform this visual information such that it can be matched to the 
symbols on the map in order for one to read the map correctly. The cognitive mechanism that 
is responsible for keeping visual information in a highly accessible state such that it can be 
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manipulated and transformed for the concurrent task is visual working memory (VWM) (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1986; Logie, 1995).  
In the current study, I shall explore the interaction between different subcomponents 
of visual selective attention (i.e., spatial attention and object-based attention) and two 
subcomponents of VWM (i.e., spatial short-term memory (STM) and object STM). In the 
following sections, I shall review studies in the literature to demonstrate that there are at least 
these two distinct types of visual selective attention and that a similar distinction exists in 
VWM. I shall also review studies to demonstrate that visual attention and working memory 
(WM) are closely related, including studies that have demonstrated that spatial attention and 
spatial WM engage similar processing resources. Finally, I shall review several recent studies 
to suggest that object-based attention and object WM also engage similar processing 
resources. The research question of the current study will be built on these lines of research.  
 
Visual Aspects of Selective Attention 
 
Although William James (1890/1950, pp. 403-404) claimed that “everyone knows 
what attention is”, several attention researchers (e.g., Pashler, 1998; Wright & Ward, 1998) 
have pointed out that attention is a complex and multi-component concept, and that there has 
been little agreement amongst attention researchers in the definition of the term. For 
example, Pashler (1998) pointed out that one’s everyday notion of attention might include the 
properties of selectivity (i.e., the ability to process some stimuli over others), limited capacity 
(i.e., inability to perform simultaneous processing) and effort (i.e., exertion is required for 
sustained processing). Wright and Ward (1998) also pointed out that there are several aspects 
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of attention, including selectivity, control, capacity, and relation to arousal and consciousness 
that are highly related but not necessarily similar to each other.  
 As attention is a theoretically loaded term and might have different meanings 
amongst different researchers within the literature, it is necessary to be explicit on the 
definition of the term ‘attention’ as it is used in the current study. Previous researchers have 
described attention as a filter (Broadbent, 1957), or a type of mental resource or capacity 
(Kahneman, 1973), or a selective attenuator (Treisman, 1964), or a type of “glue” that binds 
features together (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), or as an emergent property of a competitive 
interaction (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). While the conceptualization of how attention works 
might differ for these different metaphors of attention, one common thread is that an 
important function of attention is to select relevant information over irrelevant information. 
Within the context of the current study, the term visual attention refers to a selective process, 
in which task relevant visual information receives more processing than task irrelevant visual 
information. This definition of visual attention emphasizes the selectivity aspect of attention 
over other aspects such as control, capacity and relationship to arousal and consciousness. 
The emphasis on the selectivity aspect of attention does not suggest that the other aspects of 
attention do not exist, or that selectivity is diametrically opposite and distinct from the other 
aspects of attention. It is possible that aspects such as control and capacity operate in tandem 
for the selection of relevant stimuli over irrelevant ones (e.g., Johnston & Heniz, 1978). For 
example, processing resources (i.e., capacity) might be required in order to initiate a selection 
episode, or a control mechanism may be required to shift the selection episode from one 
stimulus to another stimulus. 
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 In terms of the cognitive conceptualization of attention, the current paper adopts the 
‘cause’ metaphor of attention (e.g., Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 1999, 2002), in which it is 
assumed that there is a controller for the attentional selection process (Posner & Peterson, 
1990; Posner, Snyder & Davidson, 1980), as opposed to an ‘effect’ metaphor of attention 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995), in which attention is conceptualized as an emergent effect with 
no explicit control mechanism. In other words, the current paper leans towards the theoretical 
suggestion that the neural implementation of the selection process is probably implemented 
by specialized underlying neural modules (e.g., Posner & Peterson, 1990) rather than from an 
interactive biased neural competition (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). However, it is noted that 
this is an emphasis rather than an assertion, in that it is possible that both ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ 
theories of attention are not necessarily contradictory, and the adoption of either 
conceptualization depends on how attentional metaphors are framed (Fernandez- Duque & 
Johnson, 1999, 2002). The ‘cause’ metaphor of attention is adopted for the current paper 
primarily for ease of description and because the metaphor ‘fits’ better with the concept of 
the central executive in the WM framework of Baddeley (1986, 2007) adopted for the current 
paper.  
A further assumption made in the current study is that the selective process of visual 
attention is not unitary, but can be fractionated into different types of selective processes. 
Specifically, I will argue that there are at least two types of visual attention, namely spatial 
based attention, in which spatial locations are the units of selection, and object-based 
attention, in which discrete objects are the units of selection. In the following sections, I shall 
review past studies that provided evidence for both types of attentional selection. 
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Spatial Visual Attention  
 
 Previous research in visual selective attention has demonstrated at least two types of 
selection units, namely spatial location (e.g., Downing & Pinker, 1985; Posner, Snyder & 
Davidson, 1980; Eriksen & Yeh, 1985) and objects (e.g., Duncan, 1984; Egly, Driver & 
Rafal, 1994; Vecera & Farah, 1994). The early research in visual selective attention centered 
on spatial locations as the unit of selection, which resulted in the dominant ‘spotlight’ and 
‘zoom lens’ metaphors of spatial attention. Evidence for the attentional selection of spatial 
location comes from spatial cueing studies. For example, Posner et al. (1980) demonstrated 
that a valid cue (i.e., a cue that occurred at the same location as the target on 80% of the 
trials) decreased reaction time (RT) to the target, and an invalid cue (i.e., one that occurred at 
a different location from the target on 20% of the trials) increased RT. This finding supported 
a ‘spotlight’ metaphor of visual selective attention, which states that attention moves through 
spatial locations akin to a spotlight beam and only visual information illuminated by this 
beam is selected. Eriksen and Yeh (1985) conducted a similar experiment, in which the target 
could appear in four possible locations and the percentage of cue validity was manipulated. It 
was demonstrated that reaction time to both the validly cued and invalidly cued targets varied 
as a function of the percentage of cue validity. Eriksen and Yeh interpreted this finding as 
supporting a ‘zoom lens’ model, in which attentional resources can be distributed over the 
visual field with low resolving power, or constricted to small portions of the visual field with 
a concomitant increase in processing power.  
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Object-based Visual Attention  
 
Despite theoretical differences between the ‘spotlight’ and ‘zoom lens’ model (e.g., 
Cave and Bichot, 1999), both models implicitly assume that attention selects spatial location 
for further processing. However, several researchers (e.g., Duncan, 1984; Egly et al., 1994; 
Pylyshyn, 2003; Scholl, 2001; Vecera, 1998) proposed that the selection unit of attention 
could be discrete objects rather than spatial locations. A study by Neisser and Becklen (1975) 
provided some early evidence for object-based selection. Subjects viewed two optically 
superimposed movie scenes at the same spatial location and were required to perform a 
‘selective looking’ task in which they had to attend to one of the superimposed scenes (e.g., a 
‘ball-game’, in which subjects counted the number of times three players passed a ball 
amongst themselves) and ignored another (e.g., a ‘hand-game’, in which two sets of hands hit 
each other). When subjects were engaged in the ‘selective-looking’ task, they were unaware 
of unexpected events that occurred in the unattended scene (e.g., the two sets of hands 
stopped and shook hands). As both the scenes were spatially superimposed, the selection of 
the attended scene could not be spatially mediated. If the attention spotlight or zoom lens had 
focused on one of the scenes, it would have included a substantial portion of the ignored 
scene, including the unexpected event as well. This early study provided some evidence that 
a unitary region of spatial selection as described by both the ‘spotlight’ and ‘zoom lens’ 
models cannot account for all forms of attentional selection. However, Scholl (2001) pointed 
out that the stimuli employed in Neisser and Becklen’s study were naturalistic and dynamic 
displays, and that it is unclear whether a movie scene constituted a single object rather than a 
perceptual group or an extended event. As such, while Neisser and Becklen provided some 
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evidence to suggest the attentional selection in their study was not spatially mediated, it is 
unclear whether it was object-based.  
A study by Rock and Gutman (1981) provided similar evidence as Neisser and 
Becklen (1975) with better-controlled stimuli. Subjects were asked to attend to one of two 
overlapping novel figures in a series of such overlapping figures. The novel figures were 
either red or green outlines and subjects were asked to attend to either the red or the green 
novel figures. It was found that subjects could recognize the attended novel figures in a later 
recognition task, but recognition for the unattended novel figures was virtually nonexistent. 
When a familiar figure (e.g., a Christmas tree) was inserted into the series of overlapping 
figures, subjects immediately recognized it when it was in the attended color, but could not 
recognize it when it was it the unattended color. This was despite the fact that the familiar 
figure in the unattended color was presented 1 second before the recognition test, 
demonstrating that failure to recognize the familiar figure when it was in the unattended color 
was a perceptual effect rather than a memory effect. Although one experiment did provide 
evidence that some of the general features of the unattended figures were recognized, the 
overall findings suggested that the form of the unattended figures were not recognized. 
Similar to the Neisser and Becklen study, neither the ‘spotlight’ nor the  ‘zoom lens’ model 
would be able to account for the findings in the Rock and Gutman study. The fact the forms 
of the unattended figures were not recognized provided some evidence that the selection was 
object-based.  
While both the Neisser and Becklen (1975) and the Rock and Gutman (1981) studies 
provided evidence of object-based selection with spatially overlapping stimuli in a focused 
attention task paradigm, Duncan (1984) used spatially overlapping stimuli with discrete 
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objects in a seminal study using a divided attention paradigm. Subjects viewed briefly 
presented masked displays, consisting of a box and a line overlapping in the same spatial 
location. Each object had two varying properties: the height of the box could be tall or short, 
and the box had a gap that was located on the left or right of the box; the texture of the line 
could be dotted or dashed, and the line could either be tilted to the left or right. Subjects were 
instructed to report two of the four properties, either from the same object (e.g., line’s texture 
and line’s tilt direction) or from different objects (e.g., line’s texture and box’s height). 
Subjects were less accurate when reporting properties from different objects than from same 
objects. Similar to the Neisser and Becklen and the Rock and Gutman studies, it would be 
difficult for spatial attention to account for this finding because the objects were spatially 
overlapping and hence would be subsumed under the same attention ‘spotlight’ or ‘zoom 
lens’. However, if the units of selection were discrete objects rather than spatial locations, an 
additional selection would be required when subjects reported properties from different 
objects, which would then result in the same object benefit (or different-object cost) that was 
observed. The findings of Duncan’s study have since been replicated when the box and the 
line were located in different locations (Vecera & Farah, 1994), or when both objects were 
identical in form and hence had similar varying properties (Awh, Dhaliwal, Christensen & 
Matsukura, 2001), or when the objects were defined by perceptual set (Baylis & Driver, 
1993), or when the objects were defined by transparent motion (Valdes-Sosa, Cobo & Pinilla, 
1998, 2000; Valdes-Sosa, Bobes, Rodriguez & Pinilla, 1998).  
The evidence for object-based attention extends beyond divided attention studies. 
Adopting a spatial cueing paradigm similar to Posner et al. (1980) in which spatial effects 
were clearly demonstrated, Egly et al. (1994) modified the paradigm to demonstrate both 
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spatial and object-based selection effects within a single task. Egly et al. employed a display 
in which two rectangle outlines were placed on the sides of an imaginary square. The end of 
one of the rectangles was cued by brightening it (i.e., its color changed from gray to white) 
on each trial with cues that were 75% valid. Subjects were instructed to detect a luminance 
decrement, which would occur at one end of one rectangle immediately after the cue. The 
luminance decrement target could appear in the same location as the cue (i.e., valid cue), or 
in a different location from the cue (i.e., invalid cue). When the targets was invalidly cued, it 
could appear at the uncued end of the cued rectangle (i.e., same-object condition) or the 
equidistant end of the uncued rectangle (i.e., different-object condition). Subjects were fastest 
to detect a target when it was validly cued. When targets were invalidly cued, subjects were 
faster to detect targets in the same-object condition compared to the different-object 
condition. Because the distance between the two target locations and the cue location for the 
invalid cue trials was identical, the faster RT in the same-object condition was interpreted as 
a ‘same-object advantage’. The findings of Egly et al. have since been replicated with objects 
defined by illusionary contours (Moore, Yantis & Vaughan, 1998) and objects defined by 
amodal completion due to an occluding object (Behrmann, Zemel & Mozer, 1998; Moore et 
al., 1998). Recent findings have identified several conditions in which the ‘same-object 
advantage’ in the spatial cueing paradigm could be modulated. For example, Shomstein and 
Behrmann (2008) demonstrated that when the presentation time of the two rectangles was 
increased, a larger same-object advantage was elicited. Hecht and Vecera (2007) 
demonstrated that the same-object advantage was eliminated when the surface outline of the 
rectangles were non-uniform (i.e., multi-colored). If one assumes that increasing the 
presentation time of the rectangles increases the perceptual strength of the rectangle as an 
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object, and that the perceptual strength of rectangles with non-uniform surfaces is decreased 
compared to rectangles with uniform surfaces according to the principle of uniformed-
connectedness (Palmer & Rock, 1994), then one can interpret the findings of Shomstein and 
Behrmann and of Hecht and Vecera as providing further support to the notion of object-based 
attentional selection within the Egly et al. paradigm; that is, the same-object advantage in the 
Egly et al. object task is modulated by the perceptual strength of the objects.  
The just reviewed studies provide ample evidence for both spatial and object-based 
attentional selection. While some researchers advocate a strong object-based selection 
position that states that attention selects discrete objects by default (e.g., Pylyshyn, 2001) or a 
strong spatial selection position that states that attention selects a spatial location prior to 
accessing any features or objects within that location (e.g., Anllo-Vento & Hillyard, 1996; 
Huang & Pashler, 2007a), the general position in the literature is that whether selection is 
spatially mediated or object-based depends on the visual task engaged (e.g., Lavie & Driver, 
1996; Vecera & Farah, 1994). Hence, describing attentional selection as both spatial and 
object-based is not necessarily contradictory. For the purpose of the present study, I assume 
that the selection unit of attention, spatial locations or discrete objects, is task dependent and 
remain agnostic towards whether attention selects spatial locations or discrete objects by 
default.  
 
Visual Working Memory or Visual Short-Term Memory? 
 
 Just as the term attention has many meanings, WM is also a term that is theoretically 
loaded and might have different meanings amongst different researchers. For example, Logie 
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(1996) pointed out that in the history of memory research, the term WM referred to different 
cognitive constructs, such as primary memory, short-term memory, language comprehension 
constraint, a processor, activation, attention and expertise. Because researchers investigating 
WM hold differing views on what constitutes as WM (see Miyake and Shah, 1999 for a 
review), it is necessary to explicitly define the WM model employed in the current paper. 
The current paper generally adopts Baddeley’s (1986, 2007) view of a multicomponent WM 
model. According to Baddeley and Logie (1999), this multicomponent WM model is non-
unitary, in that WM is fractionated into different subcomponents. Although WM can be 
influenced by information from long-term memory, it is distinct from long-term memory and 
not an activated portion of long-term memory as posited by some models (e.g., Cowan, 1995, 
1999; Engle, Kane & Tuholski, 1999). 
In the initial formulation of his working memory model, Baddeley (1986; Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974) proposed three components for the architecture of the WM system: (1) a central 
executive with control and supervisory functions, also involved in complex cognitive tasks 
like reasoning and comprehending, (2) an articulatory loop for the maintenance and rehearsal 
of verbal information, and (3) a visuo-spatial sketchpad for maintaining visuo-spatial 
information. Baddeley (2000, 2007) added a fourth component to the model called the 
episodic buffer, a limited capacity system that provides temporary storage of information 
held in multimodal code. The episodic buffer is also thought to be capable of binding 
information from the other components, and also from long-term memory, into a unitary 
episodic representation. As the emphasis of the current study will be on the visual aspects of 
WM, the visuo-spatial sketchpad will be the focus of the study.  
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Within the context of the Baddeley WM model, different types of WM tasks have 
been used (see Baddeley, 1986 for a review) with different emphasis on either the storage or 
the manipulation aspects of WM. Hence, the term WM is ambiguous because different 
researchers might use the term WM to refer to tasks that might have different emphasis. For 
example, one set of tasks that are described as WM tasks are ‘span tasks’ used by Engle and 
colleagues (e.g., Engle, Kane et al., 1999; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin & Conway, 1999; Kane, 
Hambrick, Tuholski, Wilhelm, Payne & Engle, 2004) in which subjects are required to 
continuously switch between two tasks, one of which is a maintenance task and the other of 
which is a task that requires some sort of verbal or visual judgment. For example, in the 
symmetry span task (Kane et al., 2004), subjects were required to recall a sequence of 
locations that were presented on a square matrix. Subjects were required to judge whether a 
pattern presented on the square matrix was symmetrical in between presentations of locations 
in the sequence. Subjects continued switching between both tasks until subjects could no 
longer recall the sequence of the locations on the matrix. The number of locations that could 
be recalled by the subject is known as the ‘span’ score. Tasks such as these, which are 
employed by Engle and colleagues focus on both the temporary maintenance of visual 
information and attentional switching between different tasks.  
Luck and colleagues (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman & Luck, 2001) 
used the term WM to refer to a set of tasks that require the temporary maintenance of 
information while engaging in another concurrent task. The general methodology is such that 
subjects are presented with an array of objects, which they have to remember in order to 
indicate whether a later probe is identical to one of the objects in the array. The probed 
memory task is employed by itself to provide a memory baseline, but often is also employed 
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in a dual-task paradigm. In the case of the latter, the object array is usually presented in the 
beginning of the trial and the probe is presented at the end of the trial, with the concurrent 
task performed in between the presentation of the object array and the probe. Tasks such as 
these, which are employed by Luck and colleagues, concentrate on the maintenance of visual 
information while a concurrent task is being performed.  
In the current paper, the task employed to engage the memory component of the 
visual system is more similar to that employed by Luck and colleagues than that employed 
by Engle and colleagues. In other words, the task emphasizes the maintenance of visual 
information without the continuous switching or shifting of attention on the visual 
information being maintained. Although Luck and colleagues used the term ‘visual working 
memory (VWM)’ to refer to these maintenance tasks (e.g., Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 
2001), others in the literature have used the term ‘visual short-term memory (VSTM)’ (e.g., 
Logie, Zucco & Baddeley, 1990; Klauer & Zhao, 2004) to describe the memory component 
engaged by the memory task employed in the current paper. Shah and Miyake (1999) argued 
that the term STM refers to a more storage-oriented notion in which information is 
temporarily stored, while WM refers to a process-oriented construct akin to a mental 
‘workspace’ in which the active processing and temporary storage of task-relevant 
information dynamically take place. In the context of Baddeley’s multicomponent WM 
model, STM would probably engage the appropriate subcomponents (i.e., phonological loop, 
visuo-spatial sketchpad) maximally and the central executive and episodic buffer minimally, 
while WM would probably engage all components of the model, especially the central 
executive. This is a view espoused by other researchers. For example, Cowan (1995, 1999) 
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defined STM as a subset of WM, while Engle, Kane et al. (1999) suggested that WM 
contains the activated traces of STM plus controlled attention.  
In order to address whether STM and WM were dissociable constructs, Engle, 
Tuholski et al. (1999) tested subjects on two types of memory tasks. One set of memory tasks 
thought to reflect WM were the tasks that required the switching of tasks during the 
maintenance of the sequence, similar to the symmetry span task described above. Another set 
of memory tasks thought to reflect STM required subjects to maintain a sequence of 
information without the need for task switching. Using both confirmatory factors analysis 
and structural equation modeling, Engle, Tuholski et al. demonstrated that both STM and 
WM reflected separate but highly correlated constructs. The early studies by Engle and 
colleagues (Engle, Kane et al., 1999; Engle, Tuholski et al., 1999) employed tasks that 
mainly involved verbal WM and verbal STM tasks and did not involve VWM and VSTM 
tasks. Hence, one could argue that these studies demonstrated the distinction between WM 
and STM in the verbal aspects of memory but not the visual aspects. However, Kane et al. 
(2004) extended this distinction to VWM and VSTM by applying similar statistical analysis 
to sets of VWM and VSTM tasks.  
Mohr and Linden (2005) provided further evidence demonstrating a similar 
distinction for visual information. Using a dual-task paradigm, Mohr and Linden presented 
subjects with colored shapes and required them either to maintain the visual information or to 
actively manipulate the visual information while concurrently performing either a random 
number generation task or a phonological task. The maintenance task is thought to engage 
VSTM, while the manipulation task is thought to engage VWM. Because the random number 
generation task engages the central executive, it would affect performance on the 
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manipulation task but not the maintenance task if the distinction between WM and STM also 
applied to visual information. Because the phonological task is thought to engage only the 
phonological loop and not the central executive or visuo-spatial sketchpad, it should affect 
neither the visual maintenance nor manipulation tasks. Mohr and Linden found that while the 
concurrent phonological task did not interfere with either task, the random number 
generation task interfered with the manipulation task. The phonological task served as a 
control task, ruling out the explanation that the interference to the visual manipulation task 
was due to a lack of processing resources (i.e., the visual manipulation task was more 
difficult). Hence, the finding suggested that VWM and VSTM engage different cognitive 
functions.  
 As mentioned, the current study will use a task involving the temporary maintenance 
of visual information without either active manipulation of the information or a requirement 
for subjects to switch repeatedly between different tasks. According to the distinction 
proposed by Shah and Miyake (1999), Cowan (1999) and Engle, Kane et al. (1999), the task 
employed in the current study does not engage VWM but does engage VSTM. Hence, I will 
follow the distinction proposed by Shah and Miyake and define the maintenance task as a 
VSTM task rather than a VWM task. In the rest of the paper, when describing previous 
research, I will use the term VSTM to denote visual maintenance tasks and the term VWM to 
denote visual manipulation tasks or task that requires constant task switching (e.g., Kane et 
al., 2004), even though the researchers in the original studies might have named them 
otherwise (e.g. Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2001). However, it is noted that both 
VSTM and VWM are closely related in that most VWM tasks probably also require the 
cognitive functions associated with VSTM. For example, if one were asked to mentally rotate 
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an image, it would be almost impossible to perform this task without temporarily maintaining 
some visual information of the manipulated image. In other words, the difference between 
VSTM and VWM could be a matter of the degree of central executive engagement rather a 
discrete difference. This point will be further elaborated in the section ‘Visual Attention and 
VSTM’. 
 
Visual Aspects of Working Memory 
 
Due to the lack of empirical data, the internal functions and structure of the visuo-
spatial sketchpad were not articulated as well as the articulatory loop in Baddeley’s earlier 
models of WM (Baddeley, 1986). However, by examining empirical studies dealing with the 
manipulation and maintenance of visual and spatial information (e.g., Logie, 1986; Logie & 
Marchetti, 1991; Logie et al., 1990; Smyth & Pendleton, 1989), Logie (1995) articulated the 
visuo-spatial sketchpad in further detail. He proposed two subcomponents for the visuo-
spatial sketchpad, namely (1) the inner scribe, which is a spatial subcomponent that deals 
with spatial and movement information, and (2) the visual cache, which is an object 
subcomponent that deals with visual information pertaining to an object (e.g. color, form, 
texture). It must be noted that while most researchers consistently name the first 
subcomponent as either spatial WM or spatial VSTM, there is less consensus with regards to 
the term used to describe the second subcomponent. Some researchers have used the term 
‘object WM’ or ‘object STM’, while others have used the term ‘visual WM’ or ‘visual STM’. 
In the current paper, I will use the terminology ‘object STM’ when describing the second 
subcomponent (i.e., the object subcomponent) and will reserve the term ‘VSTM’ as a 
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reference to both subcomponents. Also, when the central executive is used in tandem with 
the both subcomponents for the manipulation of visual information, the term ‘VWM’ will be 
used. Similarly, the terms ‘object WM’ and ‘spatial WM’ will be used when either the first 
subcomponent or the second subcomponent is used in tandem with the central executive.  
Evidence for the spatial subcomponent was derived from studies that demonstrated 
the interference effect of concurrent movements on the retention of spatial patterns (e.g., 
Logie et al., 1990; Smyth & Pendleton, 1989). For example, Logie et al. (1990) employed a 
dual-task paradigm in which subjects performed a memory span task either for spatial 
locations in a visual matrix pattern or for a visually presented letter sequence. In the first 
experiment, these two span tasks were combined concurrently either with an arithmetic task 
or with a task that involved manipulation of visuo-spatial material. In the second experiment, 
the two span tasks were combined with two established tasks developed by Brooks (1967) 
that controlled for difficulty in a visuo-spatial task and a verbal task. The findings from both 
experiments indicated that while the arithmetic and the verbal tasks disrupted the letter span 
more than the visual span, the visuo-spatial tasks disrupted the visual span more than the 
letter span. Because the visual span task required subjects to maintain the spatial locations 
presented in a visual matrix, Logie et al. proposed that the findings were consistent with a 
subsystem of VSTM that deals with spatial information and that could be dissociable from 
verbal VSTM. Evidence for the object subcomponent comes from studies parallel to the one 
described above. For example, Logie (1986) asked subjects to memorize a list of concrete 
words using either verbal rote rehearsal or a visual imagery mnemonic. Subjects were 
concurrently presented with either visual images or auditory speech that they were told to 
ignore. The presentation of unattended visual images interfered with the use of the visual 
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mnemonic but not the verbal rote rehearsal, while the unattended auditory speech interfered 
with the use of the verbal rote rehearsal but not the visual mnemonic. Logie (1986) 
interpreted this finding as demonstrating a subsystem of VSTM that deals with visual 
information pertaining to an object and that is dissociable from verbal VSTM.  
 Logie and Marchetti (1991) provided evidence that the spatial and object 
subcomponents within the visuo-spatial sketchpad were dissociable. They showed that arm 
movements concurrent with a retention interval interfered with the retention of spatial 
patterns, but not object information (i.e., color), whereas a concurrent visual interference task 
disrupted the retention of object information, but not spatial patterns. A similar study by 
Tresch, Sinnamont and Seamon (1993) also revealed a double dissociation between spatial 
and object STM. Subjects were asked to perform either a movement discrimination spatial 
task or a color discrimination object task while remembering either the location of a dot (a 
spatial memory task) or the shape of an object (an object memory task). Spatial STM was 
selectively impaired by the movement discrimination spatial task, while object STM was 
selectively impaired by the color discrimination object task.  
Further evidence for distinct components in VSTM comes from research in 
neuroscience. Smith et al. (1995) measured subjects’ brain activity using positron emission 
topography (PET) while they engaged in either a spatial memory task (i.e., retaining the 
position of three dots for 3 seconds) or an object memory task (i.e., retaining the identity of 
two objects for 3 seconds). The PET measures revealed that different parts of the brain were 
activated for the maintenance of visual and spatial information respectively. The spatial 
memory task activated only the right hemisphere regions, while the object memory task 
activated primarily left hemisphere regions. This suggested that different biological 
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substrates were involved in the maintenance of spatial and object information respectively. 
Further research with PET measures by Smith and Jonides (1997) replicated the above 
findings and demonstrated that the biological substrates associated with both the object and 
spatial STM subcomponents can be dissociated from the biological substrates associated with 
verbal STM.  
 While the studies described above provide evidence for an object and a spatial 
subcomponent in VWM, it must be noted that not every WM model supports such a 
distinction. On the one hand, certain models propose a WM model that is unitary in nature 
(e.g., Cowan, 1995, 1999) or domain free (e.g., Conway & Engle, 1994; Engle, Conway, 
Tuholski & Shisler, 1995). On the other hand, several researchers have proposed a finer 
distinction among subcomponents of VWM (e.g. see Cornoldi & Vecchi, 2003, for a review). 
In the current paper, I shall adopt the visuo-spatial sketchpad component of the WM model 
proposed by Baddeley (1986) and Logie (1995) as my definition of VWM and I shall 
concentrate on just maintenance of information. Thus, VWM has both an object STM and a 
spatial STM subcomponent. Although it is possible that the visuo-spatial sketchpad might not 
be an accurate or precise model of VWM, it should not affect the interpretation of the 
findings of the current study. For example, while Cowan (1995) noted that a unitary WM 
model makes no differentiation between WM and long-term memory representations, the 
representations in question could be multi-modal in nature. Hence, one can be agnostic 
towards the assumption of whether WM is differentiated from long-term memory and still 
assume that different modes of WM representation affect attention differentially. Similarly, if 
the subcomponents of WM were more finely differentiated (Cornoldi & Vecchi, 2003), it 
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would mean the findings in the current study might be incomplete because only two 
subcomponents of visual WM were investigated, but not necessarily incorrect.  
 
Visual Attention and VSTM 
 
 Two conclusions can be drawn from the review thus far. First, there are at least two 
types of visual selective attention, namely spatial attention and object-based attention. 
Second, there are at least two subcomponents of STM, namely spatial STM and object STM. 
On the surface, one cannot help but notice the similarities between visual selective attention 
and VSTM, in that both consist of a spatial and object component. Given what is known 
about how visual information is processed by the brain, this similarity may not be 
coincidental. Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982) established that two distinct cortical visual 
pathways exists in the non-human primate visual system, namely the ventral pathway that is 
thought to be associated with recognizing an object and understanding what it is (i.e., the 
‘what’ of an object) and the dorsal pathway that is thought to be associated with analyzing 
the spatial location of an object (i.e., the ‘where’ of an object). Subsequent research has 
suggested that a similar organization could be present in humans (Haxby, Grady, Horwitz, 
Ungerleider et al., 1991; Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994). Hence, it would not be surprising if a 
similar distinction were to be found in both visual selective attention and VSTM. As first 
reviewed, there is evidence for both object-based and spatial components of visual attention 
and VSTM. What is not established is evidence that both cognitive components are highly 
related. In the following paragraphs, I shall review studies to present the case that visual 
attention and VSTM are highly related cognitive components. 
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Role of Attention in WM Models 
 
 From a theoretical perspective, several WM models regard attention as an important 
component in their model. For example, in Baddeley’s (1986) multi-component model, 
attention is thought to be an important aspect of the central executive component that 
facilitates its control and supervisory functions. In line with this view, Baddeley (1996) 
provided some preliminary data to suggest that the capacity for focused selective attention 
provides a promising further component of a complete specification of the central executive. 
Another WM model in which attention plays an important role is the embedded-processes 
WM model proposed by Cowan (1995). According to Cowan, attention is required to activate 
a subset of long-term memory, which then becomes ‘working memory’. Hence, any 
information that is in the focus of attention would be in working memory, though the inverse 
is not true. Another WM model proposed by Engle and colleagues (e.g., Conway & Engle, 
1994; Engle et al., 1995) also included attention as an important component. In fact, Engle, 
Kane et al. (1999) defined WM as STM (activated portion of long-term memory) plus 
controlled attention. For example, Kane, Bleckley, Conway and Engle (2001) demonstrated 
that individual differences in performances on an antisaccade task, in which controlled 
attention is required, correlate highly with WM capacity, such that individuals who 
performed better on the antisaccade task had a higher WM capacity. However, it must be 
noted that most of the empirical data that support the above WM models come from 
investigation on verbal WM rather than visual WM.  
  A study by Schmidt, Vogel, Woodman and Luck (2002) investigated the role of 
visual attention in the transfer of perceptual representations into VSTM. Subjects were 
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required to remember an array of six colored squares. Prior to the presentation of the array, a 
cue appeared at the location of one of the squares in the array. After the array was presented, 
there was a delay interval before a probe square was presented at the location of one of the 
squares in the previous array. Subjects were required to indicate whether the color of the 
probe was the same as the color of the square that was at that location in the previous array. 
Subjects were more accurate on this VSTM task when the probe appeared in a previously 
cued location, even when the cue was not predictive of the probe location. This finding 
suggested that the deployment of visual attention could influence the transfer of perceptual 
representations into VSTM.  
 
Role of WM in Attention Models 
 
 Even though most theories of attention do not explicitly describe the role of VWM, 
its role is usually implied in the models. For example, most spatial attention theories based 
on studies in visual search postulate that the visual system creates an internal template of the 
target for matching items in the search array (e.g., Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Wolfe, 
1994). Hence, WM is probably required to maintain the internal template while the system 
engages in the search process. Recent studies have also shown that the contents of WM can 
direct attentional deployment. For example, several studies have demonstrated attentional 
capture by objects that were stored in WM (e.g., Downing, 2000; Huang & Pashler, 2007b; 
Olivers, Meijer & Theeuwes, 2006; Pashler & Shiu, 1999; Soto, Heinke, Humphreys & 
Blanco, 2005; but see Downing and Dodds, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2007). The standard 
paradigm was that subjects were asked to remember an object, for a test at the end of each 
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trial, while searching for a target in an array. RT was faster when the object in WM matched 
the target, but slower when the object in WM matched a distractor. While the mechanism 
involved in the presumed capture of attention by the object in WM is still under debate, the 
finding suggests that WM also has a role in the determining the deployment of attention, 
similar to the role that visual selective attention has in determining the type of information 
that enters visual WM. 
The role of attention in the described WM models (Cowan, 1999; Engle, Kane et al., 
1999) is to act mainly as a controller, in that it allows the switching of processing resources 
between concurrent tasks while maintaining or manipulating task relevant information in a 
temporary workspace. However, most of the discussed studies did not directly employ a 
visual attention task that required subjects to select a specific visual target over other 
distractors while maintaining relevant visual information in VSTM. In a paper reviewing 
studies that demonstrated the possible functions of the central executive, Baddeley (1996) 
pointed out while there are numerous studies that investigated the role of the central 
executive as a ‘controller’ while information was being maintained or manipulated, there was 
a general lack of empirical data investigating the role of the central executive as a ‘selector’ 
or ‘inhibitor’ (i.e., attentional selection) in similar situation. For example, in the Mohr and 
Linden (2005) study in which a difference was found between maintaining and manipulating 
information, the task employed to engage central executive was the random number 
generation task, which taps into the ‘controller’ role of attention. Thus, the finding that the 
maintenance task, in which only VSTM was engaged, was not affected by engaging the 
central executive, has not been demonstrated when the role of the central executive is a 
‘selector’. Also, in the Kane et al. (2004) study in which a distinction was found between 
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VWM and VSTM using both confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling, 
the role of attention was to control the switching of the maintenance task and the visual task 
rather than to select information. In the following paragraphs, recent studies are described in 
which attention acts as a ‘selector’ in dual-task interference paradigms involving the 
engagement of VSTM. The general finding in these studies is that when the role of attention 
(i.e., the central executive) is that of a ‘selector’ rather than a ‘controller’, VSTM 
performance is affected when the central executive is engaged.  
 
Relationship between VSTM and Visual Attention 
 
 In terms of the relationship between visual attention and VSTM, Awh and colleagues 
(e.g., Awh & Jonides, 2001; Awh, Vogel & Oh, 2006) have proposed that VSTM and visual 
attention are closely related. Most of the evidence for such a claim comes from findings in 
spatial attention and spatial STM. Awh, Jonides and Reuter-Lonrez (1998) conducted a series 
of experiments to demonstrate that spatial attention is required for the maintenance of spatial 
locations in STM. Subjects were instructed to maintain the location or the identity of a letter 
that appeared in a specific location. While holding the information in VSTM, they had to 
make a speeded response to a target that appeared on the screen. RT was faster when the 
target appeared in the same location as the memory cue only when subjects maintained 
location information in VSTM. This suggested that the subjects deployed attention spatially 
to the locations that they were trying to maintain in STM. In another experiment, Awh et al. 
(1998) asked subjects to maintain the spatial location of an object in VSTM. During the 
retention period, subjects were asked to perform a color discrimination task. The critical 
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manipulation was that on half of the trials, the color task required a shift of attention because 
of the size and eccentricity of the stimuli (the shifting-attention condition), while on the other 
half of the trials, the stimuli were large enough to occlude all potential memorized locations 
and no attention shifts were required (the static-attention condition). Subjects were less 
accurate on the memory task in the shifting-attention condition compared to the static-
attention condition. Again, this finding suggested that spatial attention is required for the 
maintenance of spatial location in VSTM.  
Further evidence for the close relationship between spatial attention and spatial 
VSTM comes from research in neuroscience. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), Awh et al. (1999) measured brain activity of subjects engaged in a spatial STM task 
and found that maintenance of spatial information led to enhanced activation in the early 
visual areas contralateral to the memorized locations. This is similar to the finding in which 
spatial attention leads to the modulation of activity in similar areas (e.g., Gratton, 1997; 
Heinze, Mangun, Burchert & Hinrichs et al., 1994). This finding was corroborated by Awh, 
Anllo-Vento and Hillyard (2000), in which subjects were asked to perform a spatial STM 
task and a spatial attention task that employed identical stimulus displays. During the delay 
of the spatial STM task, behaviorally irrelevant probe stimuli were flashed at both 
memorized and non-memorized locations. Event-related potential (ERP) measures were used 
to assess the visual processing of the probes. Early ERP components were enlarged in 
response to a probe that appeared at memorized locations. These visual modulations were 
similar in latency and topography to those observed in the spatial attention task, again 
suggesting that spatial attention and spatial STM activate similar brain regions.  
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 The studies of Awh and colleagues just described claimed that spatial attention and 
spatial STM engage similar processing resources by demonstrating that both spatial attention 
and spatial STM tasks activate similar brain regions (Awh et al., 1999; Awh et al., 2000), or 
that the engagement of spatial STM inevitably leads to spatial attention being engaged onto 
the maintained spatial locations (Awh et al., 1998), or that directing spatial attention away 
from maintained spatial locations decreased VSTM performance (Awh et al., 1998). Another 
line of studies employing a dual-task paradigm reached similar conclusions (Oh & Kim, 2004; 
Woodman & Luck, 2004). Subjects were asked to maintain either spatial information or 
object information such as color (Oh & Kim, 2004) or shape (Woodman, Luck & Vogel, 
2001) in VSTM. They were tested on this information at the end of each trial. During the 
delay between initial encoding and the test at the end of the trial, subjects were asked to 
perform a visual search task, a task in which spatial attention is thought to be engaged. There 
was no difference in search slopes for the visual task when subjects remembered object 
information (color, shape) compared to the baseline control condition (visual search task 
without maintaining any visual information in VSTM), but search slopes were steeper when 
subjects maintained spatial information in VSTM. This suggested that maintaining spatial 
information in VSTM interfered with the visual search task, providing more evidence for the 
claim that spatial attention and spatial STM engage similar processing resources.  
 Another inference from the findings of Oh and Kim (2004) and Woodman, Luck and 
Vogel (2001) was that object STM does not interfere with spatial attention. Tan (2008) 
pointed out that there were two possible explanations for the non-interference of maintaining 
object information in STM on spatial attention. First, many theories of visual attention (e.g., 
Treisman, 1988; Treisman & Gormican, 1998) claim that spatial location is a ‘special 
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feature’ compared to other visual features. For example, in Treisman’s Feature Integration 
Theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), attention is required to bind visual features to a spatial 
location to form a coherent object. If spatial features are special, it is possible that spatial 
STM is accessed whenever any form of visual attention is engaged. Hence, the loading of 
spatial STM would affect all forms of visual attention and not just spatial attention. The 
alternative explanation is that the interference is specific, such that loading spatial STM 
affects spatial attention more than other forms of visual attention. While neither explanations 
necessarily contradicts the assumption that spatial attention and spatial STM engage similar 
processing resources (e.g., Awh et al., 2006; Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004), the 
former explanation implicitly posits a hierarchical relationship between spatial STM and 
attention not inherently obvious in the explanation posited by either Oh and Kim or Luck and 
Vogel.  
 Tan (2008) attempted to distinguish between these two alternatives by adopting a 
dual-task paradigm similar to Oh and Kim (2004). Subjects were asked to maintain in VSTM 
either spatial locations or the colors of objects in a visual array. However, instead of 
performing a visual search task concurrently, subjects performed a version of the Duncan 
(1984) task, which as noted earlier, is presumed to tap into object-based attention. In the first 
experiment, the Duncan task was modified such that only a single speeded response was 
required (unlike the original Duncan task which required two unspeeded response), making it 
similar to the visual search task employed in Oh and Kim (in which only a single speeded 
response was required). There were two conditions in the Duncan task: subjects monitored 
(and reported) properties either from the same object or from different objects. When 
compared to the baseline object-based attention task in which subjects’ VSTM was not 
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loaded, the different-object cost (i.e., the difference in mean accuracy of same object and 
different objects conditions) did not differ significantly when subjects remembered color, but 
was significantly larger when subjects remembered spatial locations, despite the fact that 
subjects found it more difficult to remember spatial locations than color (i.e., they showed 
higher RT and lower mean accuracy). These results suggested that maintaining object 
information, but not spatial information, in VSTM interfered with object-based attention and 
that object-based attention and object STM engaged similar processing resources. Also, the 
results suggested that the interference effect of loading spatial STM on spatial attention was 
specific, that is loading spatial STM did not affect all forms of visual attention. 
In Tan’s (2008) second experiment, the original version of the Duncan (1984) task 
with two unspeeded responses was employed. While there was no difference in performance 
on the Duncan task regardless of whether subjects remembered spatial or color information, 
there was more interference on the mean accuracy in the VSTM task in the dual-task 
condition relative to the baseline condition when subjects remembered color, despite the fact 
that the spatial STM task was more difficult. This finding is consistent with the claim that 
object-based attention and object STM engage similar processing resources. Matsukura and 
Vecera (2008) also found that when subjects performed the Duncan task, mean accuracy in 
the VSTM task in the dual-task condition was lower relative to the baseline when subjects 
remembered color than when they remembered spatial locations. Furthermore, Matsukura 
and Vecera also demonstrated that when subjects performed a visual search task, the mean 
accuracy in the VSTM task in the dual-task condition was lower relative to the baseline when 
subjects remembered spatial locations than when they remembered color. In other words, 
Matsukura and Vecera demonstrated a double dissociation of the interference effect of 
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loading both spatial and object STM on spatial and object-based attention. This is consistent 
with the claims proposed earlier, in that object STM and object-based attention engaged 
similar processing resources (Tan, 2008), as did spatial STM and spatial attention (Oh & 
Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004).  
Based on the numerous studies cited above (Awh et al., 1998; Awh et al., 1999; Awh 
et al., 2000; Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004; Tan, 2008; Woodman & Luck, 
2004; Woodman et al., 2001), the relationship between spatial and object-based attention 
with spatial STM and object STM can be summarized by the model depicted in Figure 1. 
There are three claims that can be derived from the model. First, spatial attention and spatial 
STM share similar processing resources. Second, object-based attention and object STM 
share similar processing resources. Third, these two sets of resources are dissociable from 
each other. As shown in Figure 1, the first claim is substantiated by numerous studies in the 
literature, while the second and third claims are less substantiated by existing studies.  
The main purpose of the present study was to test the three claims derived from the 
model depicted in Figure 1 (bottom), especially the claim that that object-based attention and 
object STM engage similar processing resources. Although the findings in Tan (2008) and 
Matsukura and Vecera (2008) support this claim, there are limitations to those findings. First, 
the stimuli employed in the object-based attention task in both studies were overlapping in 
the same spatial location and hence no spatial selection was required. Thus, it is not 
surprising that loading spatial STM did not affect the task. Second, both studies demonstrated 
the interference effect of object STM on object-based attention with the Duncan (1984) task. 
The claim that object-based attention and object STM engage similar resources would be 
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stronger if the findings could be extended to other object-based attention tasks, such as that 
used by Egly et al., (1994).  
 
 
Figure 1.    Proposed relationship between visual attention and VSTM. It is proposed 
      that spatial attention and spatial STM share similar processing resources,  
      that object-based attention and object attention also share similar processing 
      resources, and that these two sets of processing resources are dissociable from 
      each other. These claims are supported by studies showing interference effects  
      when spatial attention and spatial STM were concurrently engaged (arrow 1),  
      studies showing interference effects when object-based attention and object  
      STM were concurrently engaged (arrow 2), studies showing that engaging  
      object-based attention and spatial STM concurrently led to little or no  
      interference effects (arrow 3), and studies showing that engaging spatial 
      attention and object STM concurrently led to little or no interference effects  
      (arrow 4). The list of studies supporting each arrow is shown in the box on the  
      bottom right corner of the figure.  
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In the current study, these two limitations are addressed. The first limitation was 
addressed in Experiment 1, in which a spatial component was included in the Duncan (1984) 
object task used in Tan (2008) and Matsukura and Vecera (2008). The second limitation was 
addressed in Experiment 2, in which the Egly et al. (1994) object task was used to test the 
claim that object-based attention and object STM share similar processing resources.  
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CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1 
 
 
 Tan (2008) and Matsukura and Vecera (2008) demonstrated that performing the 
Duncan object task (Duncan, 1984) interfered with the object STM task more than the spatial 
STM task and suggested that object-based attention and object STM engage similar 
processing resources. However, the stimuli used in these studies did not have a spatial 
component, in that both the line and the box were spatially overlapped in the same location. 
Hence, it is possible that interference on the spatial STM task was less than on the object 
STM task because no spatial selection was required by the task. In the current experiment, I 
explored whether performing an object-based attention task with a spatial component would 
still result in the same interference effect on object STM.  
One obvious candidate for the exploration of this issue would be to modify the object 
task used in Tan (2008) and Matsukura and Vecera (2008) so as to include a spatial 
component. Previous studies in which a spatial component was included in such a task found 
mixed results (e.g. Awh et al., 2001; Kramer, Weber & Watson, 1997; Vecera & Farah, 
1994). For example, Vecera and Farah employed procedures and stimuli that were similar to 
Duncan (1984), but on half of the trials, the box and the line were spatially separated instead 
of spatially overlapping. Vecera and Farah found that the different-object cost was similar 
whether the box and the line were spatially overlapping or separated. This suggested that the 
object-based attention effect was spatially invariant because selection was engaged onto a 
spatially invariant representation of the stimuli. 
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 Their view was challenged by Kramer et al. (1997), who employed procedures and 
stimuli similar to Vecera and Farah (1994), with the exception that the stimuli in the spatial 
overlapping condition were presented in the same position as those in the spatially separated 
condition (i.e., in the periphery) rather than in the center of the screen (i.e., in the fovea). 
Additionally, on 25% of the trials, subjects also had to make a speeded response to a post-
display probe before reporting the two monitored properties. The probe could appear either at 
the same spatial location as the target object (ipsilateral) or on the opposite side 
(contralateral). Kramer et al. found that the different-object cost was larger when the box and 
the line were separated. Furthermore, the result of the post-display probe task suggested that 
attention was directed to the location of the target objects, such that RT for probes on the 
same side as the target object was faster. This suggested that the object-based attention effect 
was not spatially invariant. Kramer et al. suggested that as a result of increased metacontrast 
masking in the periphery (Breitmeyer, 1984), there was increased interference between the 
box and the line when they were presented overlapping in the periphery, which led to a 
decrease in the different-object cost. Indeed, the difference in the different-object cost 
between the spatial overlapping and separated conditions was eliminated when Kramer et al. 
presented the stimuli in the spatial overlapping condition in the fovea. Based on these results, 
Kramer et al. claimed that the object-based attention selection demonstrated by Vecera and 
Farah is not entirely spatially invariant and their results for the spatially separated condition 
could be obtained based on spatial selection without positing a spatially irrelevant object-
based selection. When the object task employed separate stimuli, Kramer et al. suggested that 
attentional selection engaged on a grouped-array representation that has spatial dimensions. 
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Vecera (1997) acknowledged that the findings in Kramer et al. (1997) showed that 
spatial selection was involved in the spatially separated condition. However, he claimed that 
Kramer et al.’s findings did not necessarily rule out a spatially invariant object-based 
attention selection and proposed an alternative account for Kramer et al.’s results. Vecera 
argued that spatial selection or object-based section might interact with one another at 
different levels of the representations in the visual system, and that this would provide an 
alternative explanation for Kramer et al.’s results. Such an account posits that multiple forms 
of attentional selection might coexist in the visual system, and that the engagement of one 
selection mechanism over another might well depend on task conditions and properties of the 
stimuli (Vecera & Farah, 1994). Furthermore, Vecera also pointed out that Kramer et al. did 
not dispute the possibility that a spatially invariant object-based attention selection is in 
principle possible. 
Awh et al. (2001) provided evidence for Vecera’s (1997) claim when they 
demonstrated spatially invariant object-based attention effect using an object task. Awh et al. 
presented subjects two different colored lines (e.g., red, green) that varied on two properties 
(texture: dotted or dashed; gap: top or bottom). The lines were presented in the periphery, 
and the spatial distance between the lines was varied (near or far). Both spatial and object-
based effects were found when the order of reporting was known in advance, but only an 
object-based effect was found when the reporting order could not be predicted. Awh et al. 
claimed that when the reporting order was known, subjects could spatially select one of the 
two objects in the initial presentation of the targets for the first report and hence this resulted 
in a spatial effect in that the report accuracy for the far condition was lower when subjects 
reported from different objects. However, when the reporting order was unknown, subjects 
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had to select both targets in the initial presentation and this eliminated the spatial effect. Awh 
et al. suggested that when the reporting order was unknown, the process of selection operates 
on representations in object working memory (Luck & Vogel, 1997). Awh et al.’s findings 
were consistent with the claims of Vecera (1997; Vecera & Farah, 1994) that the engagement 
of one attentional mechanism over another might well depend on task conditions and 
properties of the stimuli.  
 Regardless of the type of representation on which the selection process operates, the 
just discussed studies (Awh et al., 2001; Kramer et al., 1997; Vecera & Farah, 1994; Vecera, 
1997) demonstrated that two conditions are essential to elicit both a spatial and an object-
based effect in the Duncan object task. First, the objects need to be presented in the periphery. 
Second, the response order of the monitored responses must be made known to the subjects. 
In the current set of experiments, these findings are exploited to explore how VSTM and 
object-based attention interact and interfere with each other using the Duncan object task 
with a spatial component.  
Three different attention tasks were used. They included a visual search task adopted 
from Matsukura and Vecera (2008), the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli (e.g., 
Duncan, 1984; Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008) and the Duncan object task with 
separated stimuli (e.g., Awh et al., 2001;Vecera & Farah, 1994; Kramer, Weber & Watson, 
1997). The role of the attention tasks was to engage the different types of processing 
resources and to determine whether there were differences in performance on the spatial and 
object STM tasks. In the visual search task, either 4 or 12 stimuli were presented in a circular 
array as shown in Figure 2 (bottom). The task was to indicate whether or not a target was 
present. The visual search task was expected to engage spatial attention. The assumption was 
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that spatial attention would be more heavily engaged when there were 12 items than when 
there were 4 items. 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample of stimuli and procedure outline of the visual search task. Target had  
    a gap in either the top or bottom. Subjects indicated whether or not a target  
    was present. The example depicts a target with a bottom gap.  
 
 
 Figure 3 (bottom) illustrates the displays in the Duncan object task with 
overlapping stimuli (Duncan, 1984). Two overlapping objects were presented centered at 
fixation. Subjects answered two questions about one object (the same object condition) or 
one question about each object (the different object condition). The task was expected to 
engage object-based attention with the assumption being that object-attention was more 
heavily engaged in the different object condition.  
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Figure 3. Sample of stimuli and procedure outline of the overlap version of the Duncan  
    object task. The example depicts a different-object condition where subjects  
    were required to report the line tilt first, followed by the box gap.  
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 4. Sample of stimuli and procedure outline of the separate version of the Duncan  
    object task. The example depicts a different-object condition where subjects  
    were required to report the line tilt first, followed by the box gap.  
  
Figure 4 illustrates the object task with separated stimuli. Two objects were presented 
at fixation, one to the left and one to the right. Subjects answered two questions about one 
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stimulus (the same object) or one question about each stimulus (the different object 
condition). Based on previous findings (e.g., Awh et al., 2001), the Duncan object task with 
separated stimuli was assumed to engage object-based attention as well as spatial attention 
with both object-based attention and spatial attention more heavily engaged in the different 
object condition. 
 
 
Figure 5. Sample of stimuli used in the memory task. The left panel denotes the memory  
    array that was presented to subjects at the beginning of each trial. The center  
    panel denotes a color probe, in which subjects have to indicate whether the  
    color of the probe matched the color of any of the squares in the memory array.  
    The right panel denotes a location probe, in which subjects have to indicate  
    whether the location probe was in the same location of any of the squares in the  
    memory array.  
 
 
The memory tasks employed in Experiment 1 included a color memory task, a 
location memory task and a double memory task. An example of the memory array and 
memory probes used in the memory tasks is shown in Figure 5 (bottom). The color and 
location memory tasks were similar to the tasks employed in Tan (2008), in that subjects 
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were asked to remember either the colors or the locations of objects in a memory array. For 
the color memory task, subjects were required to indicate whether a centrally presented probe 
was the same color as any of the objects in the memory array. For the location memory task, 
subjects indicated whether a black outline probe was at the same location as any of the 
objects in the memory array. Based on previous findings (e.g., Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; 
Tan, 2008), it was assumed that the color memory task engaged object STM, while the 
location memory task engaged spatial STM.  
In the case of the double memory task, subjects were instructed to remember both the 
colors and the locations of objects in the memory array. The testing procedure was identical 
to that used for the color and the location memory tasks. Thus, subjects were never tested on 
the conjunctions of location and color, but only on either color or location information. 
Subjects were not tested on the conjunctions of the memory array because additional 
attentional resources would be required to bind both the location and color information into a 
coherent object (Wheeler & Treisman, 2002), which might interfere with the performance of 
the attention or memory task. While this might be an interesting research question in its own 
right, it would detract from the research question in the current study, which is whether 
object-based attention and object STM engaged similar processing resources. Hence, by 
testing either the location memory or the color information and not the conjunction of both, 
the double memory task was assumed to engage both object and spatial STM with minimal 
attentional requirements.  
A dual-task paradigm was employed as the general procedure in Experiment 1, as 
shown in Figure 6 (bottom). Each group of subjects performed different combinations of 
tasks, which included an attention task and a VSTM task, in order to explore the interference 
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effects of one task on the other. Each group of subjects performed three different conditions, 
namely the attention baseline condition, the VSTM baseline condition and the dual-task 
condition.  
 
 
Figure 6. Sample of stimuli and procedure outline of a trial in the dual-task condition.  
     Subjects began articulatory suppression when presented the “Get Ready!”  
    frame. The memory array was presented before the attention task. Memory  
    probes were presented after the attention task. Presentation sequence was  
    similar in attention baseline, memory baseline and dual-task conditions. 
 
  
In Experiment 1, the question addressed with the different attentional and memory 
tasks described above was whether the failure to find interference in the location memory 
condition in Tan (2008) and Matsukura and Vecera (2008) was due to the lack of a spatial 
component in their object task. Matsukura and Vecera (2008) and Tan (2008) found 
differences in the memory tasks rather than on the attention task, so the same was expected in 
Experiment 1. Thus, the question of interest was whether an interference effect would still be 
found in the color memory task when a spatial component is added to the Duncan object task 
by spatially separating the stimuli (Vecera & Farah, 1994). It was assumed that the Duncan 
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object task with separated stimuli engaged both spatial and object-based attention. 
Comparing the interference on the memory task resulting from the different attention tasks 
should lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the interaction between the different 
types of visual attention and VSTM. 
In the case of the visual search task and the Duncan object task with overlapping 
stimuli, the predicted pattern of interference on the color and location memory tasks are those 
already shown in previous studies. For the visual search task, accuracy on the location 
memory task should decrease with the increase of the number of search items (Matsukura 
and Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004), because spatial attention is 
engaged to a larger extent when searching for a target amongst more distractors. However, 
accuracy on the color memory task should not be affected by the number of search items 
(Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman et al., 2001). For the Duncan 
object task with overlapping objects, there should be a larger interference effect on the color 
memory task than the location memory task (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008). 
Furthermore, because an additional object-based attentional selection is required for the 
different objects condition, there should be a decrease in accuracy on the color memory task 
in the different objects condition compared to the same object condition, but no difference in 
the accuracy on the location memory task between the same and different objects condition 
(Tan, 2008). 
 In the case of the Duncan object task with separated stimuli, the prediction of the 
interference on color and location memory task accuracy in the dual-task condition is less 
straightforward. If, based on previous studies, it is assumed that spatial and object-based 
attention are dissociable cognitive components (Awh et al., 2001; Vecera & Farah, 1994), 
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that spatial and object STM are also dissociable types of VSTM (Logie, 1995; Smith et al., 
1995; Tresch et al., 1993), that spatial attention and spatial STM engage similar processing 
resources (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004), and that 
object-based attention and object STM engage similar processing resources (Matsukura & 
Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008), then there should be interference on both the color and location 
memory tasks. If the additional selection required for the different object condition engages 
both spatial and object-based attention to a larger extent, there should be lower accuracy for 
both the color and location memory tasks on the different objects condition compared to the 
same object condition. However, as suggested by Kramer et al., (1997), when a spatial 
component is introduced to the Duncan object task, spatial attention might drive the selection 
process and override object-based attention. If this were the case, interference would occur 
only on the location memory task and not on the color memory task. While such a finding 
would not necessarily contradict the findings and claims of Matsukura and Vecera (2008) 
and Tan (2008) that object-based attention and object STM engage similar processing 
resources, it would suggest a limited or boundary conditions under which this would occur.  
One memory task condition not included in either Tan (2008) or Matsukura and 
Vecera  (2008) is the double memory condition. This was included in the current study to 
examine the possible interference effect that the different attention task on the different 
memory tasks might have in a more sensitive within-subjects design. Also, the double 
memory condition was included to investigate whether the interference effect of the attention 
tasks on both object and spatial STM are distinct in the case when both are loaded. Previous 
studies have demonstrated a dissociation between object and spatial STM (e.g., Smith et al., 
1995). Based on the literature, (e.g., Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004), one 
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should expect no interactions between the two different types of memory when they are both 
loaded in the context of a dual-task paradigm. However, this claim has not been 
systematically and empirically tested to the best of my knowledge. The double memory 
condition in the current study allowed a test of this claim. If the interference effect obtained 
for the color and location probes in the double memory condition is similar to that obtained 
from the color and location memory tasks respectively, this will provide more evidence for 
the claim that different sets of processing resources are indeed dissociable. However, if the 
pattern of interference is not similar for the double memory condition compared to the 
individual memory conditions, then this will suggest that the different processing resources 
just described may not be completely dissociable.  
To summarize, four claims were tested in Experiment 1, including (a) spatial attention 
and spatial STM share similar processing resources, (b) object-based attention and object 
STM share similar processing resources, (c) these two sets of processing resources are 
dissociable, and (d) spatial features are not dominant over object features when both spatial 
and object STM or attention are engaged. The predicted results for each claim are 
summarized in Table 1.  
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Method 
 
Subjects and Design 
 
Subjects were 270 students with normal or corrected-to-normal vision who 
participated for course credit after giving informed consent. The data from an additional 28 
subjects were discarded due to low accuracy rates in the attention task (< 70%). Three types 
of memory task (i.e., location, color and dual-memory) and three types of attention task (i.e., 
visual search, Duncan object task with overlapping and separated stimuli) were factorially 
combined. Thirty subjects were randomly assigned to each of the nine resulting task 
combinations (i.e., one attention task and one memory task). Within each task combination, 
there were three task conditions: memory task baseline, attention task baseline and dual-task. 
The order of the three task conditions was counterbalanced across subjects within each 
attention/memory task combination.  
 
Tasks 
 
 For all tasks, the displays consisted of black figures on a white background unless 
otherwise noted. This is because previous studies also employed similar stimuli (e.g., 
Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Vecera & Farah, 1994). The experiment was written using E-
PRIME (www.psnet.com). The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch Dell Monitor. Subjects 
viewed the display freely from approximately 23.6 inches and wore sound deadening 
earmuffs throughout the experiment. 
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 Memory task. Figure 5 (page 36) shows an example of the display frames and 
procedural outline of the memory task. The stimuli for the memory task were two colored 
squares each 0.25" x 0.25" (visual angle = 0.60º x 0.60º) in size. The colors and locations of 
the squares were selected randomly from eight possible colors (red, yellow, green, blue, 
magenta, brown, cyan and gray) and locations (eight points on an imaginary circle with a 
radius of 2.05", visual angle = 5.0º, from fixation). For the color memory task, subjects 
remembered the colors of the squares. At the end of the trial, one colored square (color 
probe, 0.25" x 0.25"; visual angle = 0.60º x 0.60º) was presented at fixation. The color of the 
probe was randomly chosen from the eight possible colors, with the restriction that it 
matched that of one of the two memory stimuli on half of the trials. Subjects made an 
unspeeded response to indicate whether the probe color was the same color as one of the two 
original squares. The procedure was similar in the location memory condition, with the 
exception that subjects remembered the spatial locations of the squares. At the end of the 
trial, one black square surrounding the area where a square might have occurred (location 
probe, 0.28" x 0.28"; visual angle = 0.68º x 0.68º) was presented. The location of the probe 
was selected randomly from the eight possible locations, with the restriction that its location 
matched that of one of the two memory stimuli on half of the trials. Subjects made an 
unspeeded response to indicate whether the probe was located at the same location as one of 
the two original squares. In the double memory condition, subjects were asked to remember 
both the color and the location of the two colored squares. On half of the trials, subjects were 
presented with a color probe and on the other half, subjects were presented with the location 
probe. For each type of probe, the value was randomly selected with the restriction that half 
matched one of the two memory stimuli. Thus, subjects needed to remember the separate 
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features rather than the conjunction of features (i.e., a specific colored square at a specific 
location). 
The memory task in the memory baseline condition consisted of 32 trials, and the 
memory task in the dual task condition consisted of 64 trials. The memory array was 
presented for 500 ms, followed by a blank frame of 750 ms prior to the onset of the attention 
task stimuli. Shortly (500 ms) after the offset of the response frame for the attention task, the 
memory probe was presented, and it remained on screen until subjects responded.  
 Object task  (object-based attention task). Figure 3 (page 34) and Figure 4 (page 35) 
illustrate examples of the series of four displays constituting the object task with overlapping 
and separated stimuli respectively. The object task stimuli were similar to those used by 
Vecera and Farah (1994). The stimuli consisted of two objects, a box and a line. Each object 
had two dimensions. The box was either short or tall and had a gap on either the left or the 
right. The line was either dotted or dashed and tilted either to the left or the right. The width 
of the box was 0.28" (visual angle = 0.67º). The height of the tall and short box was 0.47" 
(visual angle = 1.14º) and 0.35" (visual angle = 0.86º) respectively. The box’s gap was 
created by removing 0.08" (visual angle = 0.20º) from one side. The length of the line was 
0.63" (visual angle = 1.53º) and it was tilted 8º rightward or leftward from the vertical 
position. The line was either dotted or dashed; dots and dashes contained the same number of 
pixels but in different pixel array configurations (Dots: 3 x 2; Dashes: 1 x 6). The box and 
line were at fixation, and were followed by a 2.18" (visual angle = 5.30º) x 1.56" (visual 
angle = 3.78º) pattern mask. In the spatial overlapping version, both the box and the line 
were presented at fixation, as illustrated in Figure 1. In the spatial separated version, the box 
and the line were each presented 0.79" (visual angle = 1.91º) from fixation, one to the left 
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and one to the right. The box appeared randomly on the left side half of the time and on the 
right side the other half, and the same was true for the line. Other than the way the box and 
the line were presented, there was no difference between the overlapping and separated 
versions of the object task.  
As typical in the literature, the object task was blocked by the dimensions to be 
monitored. In the same-object condition, subjects monitored either the box gap and box 
height, or the line texture and line tilt. In the different-object condition, the subjects 
monitored either box gap and line texture, or box gap and line tilt, or box height and line 
texture, or box height and line tilt. Because the number of dimension-pairs for different 
objects was twice that of the same object, each set of dimension-pairs from the same object 
blocks was used twice, thus equating the number of “same-object” and “different-object” 
trials. Non-reported dimensions did not vary within each block: the box height was short, the 
box gap was on the right, the line tilt was to the right and the line texture was dashed. 
 The object task consisted of 8 blocks. Subjects were instructed to monitor a pair of 
dimensions for each block; to be monitored dimension-pairs were randomly ordered across 
blocks. Subjects were also instructed to be as accurate as possible in their reports. There were 
8 trials in each block, such that reported properties and spatial location of the box and line 
(when they were separated) were counterbalanced and randomly ordered in each block. After 
the presentation of the 500 ms blank frame following the memory task stimuli, the box and 
the line were presented for 200 ms followed by the pattern mask for 200 ms. The first 
dimension to report and the description of the response alternatives were then presented, and 
they remained on the screen until response. Subjects pressed “1” to indicate the first 
alternative (e.g., box gap: left) or “2” to indicate the second alternative (e.g., box gap: right). 
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The second dimension to report and the description of the response alternatives were then 
presented, again remaining on screen until the response was made. Again, subjects pressed 
“1” to indicate the first alternative (e.g., line tilt: left) or “2” to indicate the second alternative 
(e.g., line tilt: right). No feedback was given for the responses in the object task.  
The order of reporting for each dimension-pair followed Vecera and Farah (1994) and 
were as such: box height followed by box gap, line texture followed by line tilt, box height 
followed by line texture, box height followed by line tilt, box gap followed by line texture, 
and box gap followed by line tilt. The choice of the report order was largely due to pragmatic 
considerations, because a full counterbalancing of the reporting order would require too 
many subjects. Awh et al. (2001) demonstrated that the spatial effect is attenuated when the 
reporting order is randomized.  
 Visual search task (spatial attention task). Figure 2 (page 33) illustrates an example of 
the stimuli used in the visual search task and also the procedural outline of the visual search 
task, which consisted of a single display. The visual search task was adopted from Matsukura 
and Vecera (2008). The search arrays consisted of 4 or 12 Landolt Cs, each measuring 0.19"  
x 0.19" (visual angle = 0.45° x 0.45°) with 0.03" line thickness (visual angle = 0.08°). 
Distractor stimuli had a 0.05" (visual angle = 0.12°) gap on the left or right side. The target 
had a similar gap on either the top or on the bottom. Targets were present on half of the trials. 
For a set size of 12, the stimuli were presented at 12 locations evenly spaced on an imaginary 
circle, with a radius of 1.56" (visual angle = 3.8°), which was centered at fixation. To 
maintain the same display density across set sizes, for a set size of 4, the stimuli were 
presented at 4 locations on a randomly chosen quarter of the imaginary circle.  
 Similar to the object task, the visual search task consisted of 8 blocks of 8 trials, 4 at 
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each set size and randomly ordered. The target was present in 4 of the trials and absent in the 
other 4 trials and this was also randomly ordered. The quadrant in which the target appeared 
was counterbalanced across the 8 blocks of trials. After the 500 ms blank delay period 
following the offset of the memory stimuli, a 4 or 12 item search array appeared and 
remained until the subject responded. Subjects made a speeded response to the search array, 
indicating whether at target was present or absent. Subjects pressed “1” if the target was 
present and “2” if the target was absent.  
 In the visual search task, the assumption is that spatial attention will be more heavily 
engaged in the more difficult 12 items search array compared to the 4 items search array. In 
this case, differences between the 4 and 12-items condition will thus reflect the differences 
due to the engagement of spatial attention. If a memory task engaged similar processing 
resources as spatial attention, then task performance of either the visual search or the 
memory task should be more affected in the 12-items condition compared to the 4-items 
condition.  
 
Procedure 
 
To minimize verbal encoding (Besner, Davies, & Daniels, 1981), subjects repeatedly 
vocalized the letters ‘ABCD’ for each trial. For the responses relating to the object task and 
the memory task, subjects were instructed to be as accurate as possible and were not given 
any time limits. For the visual search task, subjects were instructed to be as fast and accurate 
as possible. The presentation sequence for the memory baseline task, the attention baseline 
task and the dual-task conditions were generally the same, such that subjects were presented 
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with the same stimulus displays for all the three task conditions. However, during the 
baseline conditions, they were instructed to ignore the stimulus displays for the irrelevant 
task and to not respond to them. In the memory baseline task condition, they ignored the 
stimulus displays for the attention task. In the attention baseline condition, they ignored the 
stimulus displays for the memory task. A white 'X' was superimposed over the stimulus 
displays of the irrelevant task. The response frames for the irrelevant tasks were presented for 
1000 ms. This included each of the two response frames in the object task, the search array in 
the visual search task and the memory probe frame in the memory task. Subjects were told to 
attend to and to respond to all the stimulus displays when they were in the dual-task 
condition.  
The general presentation sequence for all task combinations is shown in Figure 6 
(page 37). At the beginning of each trial, “Get Ready!” was presented at fixation for 750 ms, 
followed by a blank frame for 750 ms. Subjects were instructed to begin repeated 
vocalization of the letters ‘ABCD’ at this time. The two randomly chosen colored squares 
were then presented for 500 ms, followed by another blank frame for 750 ms. This was 
followed by the presentation of the stimuli for the attention task, followed by the response 
frame for the attention task, followed by the probe and the response frame for the memory 
task. “End” was then presented at fixation, prompting subjects to stop vocalizing. Subjects 
then initiated the next trial with the spacebar. 
To familiarize the subjects with the stimulus displays sequences, they were required 
to complete practice trials prior to the experimental trials for each task. Subjects practiced 10 
trials for the memory baseline condition, 16 trials for the attention baseline condition, and 16 
trials for the dual-task condition. Subjects assigned to the object task conditions practiced 8 
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trials for each monitored dimension combination for the object task prior to starting the 
experimental trials and also 8 slower presentation trials before each block to become 
familiarized with the required response mapping for that block. In order to make the visual 
search task condition as similar as possible to the overlapping and separated object task 
conditions, the subjects practiced 48 trials of the visual search task (24 trials of 4 and 12 
objects each) prior to starting the experiment and also 8 slower presentation trials before each 
block to familiarize them with the required response mapping, even though the response 
mapping for the visual search task was the same for all blocks.  
 
Experiment 1: Results and Discussion 
 
 In Experiment 1, three different attention tasks were factorially crossed with three 
different memory tasks for nine separate groups of subjects. Within each attention and 
memory task combination, subjects performed three task conditions: the dual-task, the 
attention baseline and the memory baseline. As the interesting findings in Experiment 1 were 
found in the memory tasks rather than the attention task performance, the results and 
discussion is organized into three sections according to the different attention tasks. This 
organization highlights the interference effect of each attention task on the performance of 
the different memory tasks. For each section, I first describe and discuss the performance of 
the attention task for both the attention baseline and dual-task conditions in terms of accuracy 
and RT (visual search task) or accuracy (Duncan object task), and I then describe memory 
accuracy on the different memory tasks for both the memory baseline and dual-task 
conditions.  
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Task Combinations Including Visual Search 
 
Attention Task: Visual Search 
 
 Based on the findings of Matsukura and Vecera (2008), one would not expect 
differences for accuracy or RT performance in the visual search task as a function of VSTM 
task. However, one would expect to find slower RT when subjects had to search for more 
items and faster RT and on trials in which the target was absent. 
 Accuracy. Mean accuracy for the visual search task is shown in Table 2 as a function 
of type of memory task (between-subjects) as well as attention task condition, set size, and 
target presence (within-subjects). Accuracy was generally high (i.e., > 0.90 in all conditions), 
showing that participants were doing the task as instructed. For each type of memory task, a 
2 (Condition: baseline vs. dual task) x 2 (Set size: 4 vs. 12) x 2 (Target presence: present vs. 
absent) repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was run on the mean accuracy 
rate in the visual search task. For each type of the memory task, the main effect of Target 
Presence was significant, in that subjects were more accurate for target absent trials than 
target present trials. The F ratios and p values for these main effects are summarized in Table 
3. For the double memory task, the main effect of Set size also was significant, F(1, 29) = 
10.61, p < .001. Mean accuracy was higher in the set size 4 (0.97) than the set size 12 
condition (0.94), 95% C.I.(0.013,0.044), supporting the assumption that spatial attention is 
more heavily engaged in a 12-items search than a 4-items search. No other main or 
interaction effects were significant, p > .10. 
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Table 2. Mean Accuracy for the Visual Search Task as a Function of Set Size, Condition,  
  and Target Presence 
 
 Baseline Dual Task 
 Set4 Set12 Set4 Set12 
 Present Absent Present Absent Present Absent Present Absent 
Color 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.93 0.98 
Location 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.93 0.97 
Double 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.96 
 
Table 3. Summary of Significant Effects for Visual Search Task Accuracy Rate 
 
95% difference C.I. Effect Memory Type F ratio p value Lower Upper 
Color  12.08 .002 0.013 0.05 
Location 9.98 .004 0.011 0.05 
Target 
Presence        
(df = 1, 29) Double 14.76 .001 0.012 0.052 
 
 RT. RT measures below 200 ms or above 3000 ms (0.9% of the data) and for 
incorrect trials were excluded from analysis. Mean RT for the visual search task is shown in 
Figure 7 as a function of type of memory task (between-subjects) as well as attention task 
condition, set size and target presence (within-subjects). For each type of memory task, a 2 
(Condition: baseline vs. dual task) x 2 (Set size: 4 vs. 12) x 2 (Target presence: present vs. 
absent) repeated-measures ANOVA was run on the mean RT of the visual search task. For 
each of the memory tasks, the typical findings for the visual search task paradigm were 
found. This included: a main effect of Set size, in that RT was slower when there were more 
items in the search array; a main effect of Target presence, in that RT was slower when the 
target was absent; and a Set size x Target presence interaction effect, in that the difference in 
RT between the set size 12 and set size 4 trials was larger when the targets were present than 
when they were absent. The F ratios and p values for these main and interaction effects are 
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summarized in Table 4. For the location memory task, the a main effect of Condition also 
was significant, F(1, 29) = 8.31, p < .007. RT was faster in the baseline (1548 ms) compared 
to the dual-task condition (1669 ms), 95% C.I. (35, 208). For the double memory condition, 
the Task x Set size interaction effect also was significant, F(1, 29) = 4.60, p < .04. The 
difference in RT between set size 12 and set size 4 trials was larger in the baseline (616 ms) 
compared to the dual-task condition (705 ms), 95% C.I.(2, 87). No other main and interaction 
effects were significant, p > .17. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Summary of Significant Effects for Visual Search Task RT 
 
95% difference C.I.a Effect Memory Type F ratio p value 
Lower Upper 
          
Color  185.64 .001 550 744 
Location 212.97 .001 608 807 
Set Size        
(df = 1, 29) 
Double 203.78 .001 566 755 
          
Color  114.03 .001 449 661 
Location 117.33 .001 433 635 
Target 
Presence        
(df = 1, 29) 
Double 14.76 .001 374 577 
          
Color  73.67 .001 26 43 
Location 72.11 .001 29 47 
Set Size X 
Target 
Presence        
(df = 1, 29) Double 91.78 .001 30 45 
a: The 95% C.I. difference for the Set Size x Present Interaction is the difference between 
the search slope (i.e., (Set Size 12 – Set Size 4)/8) for absent and present trials 
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Figure 7. Mean RT in the visual search task in the attention baseline and dual-task  
    conditions for the different types of memory task in Experiment 1. Left Panel: 
    Color memory task; Center Panel: Location memory task; Right Panel: Double  
   memory task. Error bars denote 95% within-subjects confidence interval. 
 
 
Overall, the RT results reflect typical findings in the visual search task. There were no 
indications of any speed-accuracy tradeoff. When subjects loaded VSTM, this did not affect 
the visual search task because the Condition variable (baseline vs. dual-task) generally did 
not interact significantly with other variables for any memory task. While RT was somewhat 
slowed when the location memory task was used (i.e., spatial STM was loaded), none of the 
interaction effects with Condition was significant. Also, although the Condition x Set size 
interaction effect was significant for those doing the double memory task, the search slope 
was lower for the dual-task than the baseline condition. Together, these results suggest that 
the visual search task in the current study is generally not affected when VSTM is loaded, 
which is similar to the findings of Matsukura and Vecera (2008). However, this finding is 
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inconsistent with the findings of Oh and Kim (2004) and Woodman and Luck (2004), where 
they found that the search slope of the visual search task increased when spatial STM was 
loaded in the dual-task condition. The different findings may be due to differences in 
procedures between the visual search tasks that may have produced differences in reliance on 
spatial STM. In both Oh and Kim, as well as Woodman and Luck, the locations of the items 
were not constrained to being locations on a circle, as they were in the current experiment 
and in Matsukura and Vecera. This issue will not be pursued further because the selective 
interference effects of primary interest were found in memory task performance in the 
current experiment as well as in the other studies. Hence, the focus will be on performance in 
the memory tasks.  
 
Memory Task 
 
 Mean accuracy on the memory task in each of the task conditions is presented in 
Figure 8 (bottom). A separate ANOVA examined performance on each memory task.  
Color memory task. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean 
accuracy rates as a function of condition (memory baseline, dual-task with 4 items search and 
dual-task with 12 items search). The one way ANOVA was significant, F(2, 58) = 22.98, p < 
.001. Paired sample t-tests showed that mean accuracy for the memory baseline condition 
(0.91) was higher for the dual-4 items condition (0.88), t(29) = 4.53, p < .001, 95% 
C.I.(0.029, 0.077) and the dual-12 items condition (0.88), t(29) = 4.79, p < .001, 95% 
C.I.(0.034, 0.085). However, there was no difference between the mean accuracy between 
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the dual-4 items and dual-12 items conditions, t(29) = 0.429, p > .67, 95% C.I.(-0.024, 
0.036).  
 
 
Figure 8. Mean accuracy in the memory task in the memory baseline, dual-task 4  
    items, and dual-task 12 items conditions for subjects performing the visual 
    search task in Experiment 1. Left Panel: Color memory task; Center Panel:  
    Location memory task; Right Panel: Double memory task. Error bars denote  
    95% within-subjects confidence interval. 
  
While there was a general overall decrease in performance on the color memory task 
for the dual-4 items and dual-12 items conditions compared to the baseline condition, 
performance on the color memory task was not affected by the difficulty of the visual search 
task in the dual-task condition. This suggests that the visual search task and the color 
memory task engaged different processing resources. The results, therefore, support the 
assumption that the visual search task engages spatial attention and the color memory task 
engages object STM, and the pools of processing engaged by these cognitive components are 
to a certain extent dissociable from each other. The results with the color memory task and 
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the interpretation that object STM does not engage the same resources as spatial attention are 
similar to those of Woodman and Luck (2001), Oh and Kim (2004) and Matsukura and 
Vecera (2008). 
Location memory task. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean 
accuracy rates as a function of condition (memory baseline, dual-task with 4 items search and 
dual-task with 12 items search). The one way ANOVA was significant, F(2, 58) = 22.23, p < 
.001. Paired sample t-tests showed that mean accuracy for the memory baseline condition 
(0.92) was higher than for the dual-4 items condition (0.88), t(29) = 2.57, p < .016, 95% 
C.I.(0.0072, 0.064) and the dual-12 items condition (0.82), t(29) = 5.94, p < .001, 95% 
C.I.(0.063, 0.133). The mean accuracy for the dual-4 items condition was higher than the for 
dual-12 items condition, t(29) = 4.69, p < .001, 95% C.I.(0.035, 0.090). There was a general 
overall decrease in performance of the location memory task for the dual-4 items and dual-12 
items conditions compared to the baseline condition, but more importantly, performance on 
the location memory task was affected by the difficulty of the visual search task. 
Performance decreased when the number of search set items increased in the dual-task 
condition. Assuming that spatial attention is engaged to a larger extent when there are more 
search items in the display, and that performance on the location memory task reflects spatial 
STM, the fact that the location memory task performance decreased with the increase of 
search items in the dual-task condition suggests that the visual search task and the location 
memory task engaged similar processing resources, which are likely to be the processing 
resources engaged by spatial attention and spatial STM. The results with the location 
memory task and the interpretation that spatial STM engages the same resources as spatial 
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attention are similar to those of Oh and Kim (2004), Woodman and Luck (2004) and 
Matsukura and Vecera (2008).  
 Double memory task. Subjects in the double memory task had to remember both color 
and the location information, but only one type of memory was probed on each trial. A 3 
(Condition: baseline vs. dual-4 items vs. dual-12 items) x 2 (Probe type: color vs. location) 
repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean accuracy rates. There was a main effect of 
Probe type, F(1, 29) = 5.84, p < .022, 95% C.I. (0.005, 0.065), in that mean accuracy for 
color probes (0.90) was better than for location probes (0.86). There also was a main effect of 
Condition, F(1, 29) = 11.70, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons showed that mean accuracy in 
the baseline condition (0.92) was marginally higher than in the dual-4 items condition (0.88), 
t(29) = 1.938, p < .062, 95% C.I.(-0.002, 0.073), and was higher in the dual-12 items 
condition (0.84), t(29) = 5.07, p < .001, 95% C.I.(0.048, 0.113). Mean accuracy in the dual-4 
items condition also was higher than in the dual-12 items condition, t(29) = 2.87, p < .008, 
95% C.I. (0.013, 0.077). The Probe type x Condition interaction effect was marginally 
significant, F(2, 58) = 2.66, p < .078. Paired sampled t-tests revealed no differences in mean 
accuracy for color and location probes in the baseline condition, t(29) = 0.56, p > .57, 95% 
C.I. (-0.033, 0.058), or the dual-4 items condition, t(29) = 0.73, p > .47, 95% C.I.(-0.030, 
0.063). However, mean accuracy for location probes was lower than for the color probes in 
the dual-12 items condition, t(29) = 3.13, p < .004, 95% C.I.(0.027, 0.13). The interaction 
shows that when spatial attention is engaged in the dual-task condition, there is selective 
interference for location probes only in the dual-12 items condition. Overall, the findings 
with the double memory task mirror the findings with the color and location memory tasks. 
When spatial attention is heavily engaged (i.e., in the 12-items visual search), it interferes 
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with spatial STM. This further strengthens the claim that spatial attention and spatial STM 
engage similar processing resources, and that these shared processing resources are 
dissociable from the resources engaged by object STM.  
 
Task Combinations Including Duncan Object Task (Overlap) 
 
Attention Task: Duncan Object Task (Overlap) 
 
 Based on previous findings (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008), one would 
expect no differences in performance in the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli as a 
function of VSTM task. However, one would expect to find higher accuracy rates when 
subjects reported both properties from the same object (e.g., Duncan, 1984). Accuracy rates 
were collapsed over the first and second report because no or only very small and non-
predicted differences were found between first and second report accuracy in a preliminary 
analysis. The accuracy rate and statistical analysis including first and second report are 
reported in Appendix A.  
Mean accuracy on the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli is shown in Figure 
9 as a function of type of memory task (between-subjects) as well as attention task condition 
and whether the reported properties were from the same or different objects (within-
subjects). A separate 2 (Condition: baseline vs. dual-task) x 2 (Properties: same object vs. 
different objects) repeated measures analysis was run on mean accuracy rate for each 
memory task. There was a main effect of Condition for each type of memory task, in that 
subjects were more accurate in the baseline condition. There also was a main effect of 
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Properties, in that subjects were more accurate when they reported properties from the same 
object. This result is consistent with the findings of previous studies (Duncan, 1984; Vecera 
& Farah, 1994). The F ratios and p values for these main effects are summarized in Table 5. 
No other main and interaction effects were significant, p > .41. Just as with the visual search 
task condition, there were no selective interference effects as a result of holding different 
types of information in STM. Hence, the focus will be on the memory task performance.  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Mean accuracy in the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli in the  
                attention baseline and dual-task conditions for the different memory tasks as a  
     function of whether the reported properties are from the same or different  
    objects in Experiment 1. Left Panel: Color memory task; Center Panel:  
    Location memory task; Right Panel: Double  memory task. Error bars denote  
    95% within-subjects confidence interval. 
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Table 5. Summary of Significant Effects for Accuracy on the Duncan Object Task  
    (Overlap) 
 
95% difference C.I. Effect Memory Type F ratio p value 
Lower Upper 
          
Color  34.09 .001 0.035 0.072 
Location 29.92 .001 0.043 0.098 
Task            
(df = 1, 29) 
Dual 43.50 .001 0.047 0.09 
          
Color  29.47 .001 0.02 0.045 
Location 22.24 .001 0.021 0.053 
Object         
(df = 1, 29) 
Dual 25.40 .001 0.02 0.048 
 
Memory Task 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean accuracy in the memory task in the memory baseline, dual-task same  
                 object and dual-task different objects conditions for subjects performing the  
     Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli in Experiment 1. Left Panel:  
     Color memory task; Center Panel: Location memory task; Right Panel: Double  
     memory task. Error bars denote 95% within-subjects confidence interval. 
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Mean accuracy on the memory task in each of the task conditions is presented in 
Figure 10. A separate ANOVA examined performance on each memory task. 
Color memory task. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean 
accuracy rates as a function of condition (memory baseline, dual-task trials with properties 
from the same object and dual-task trials with properties from different objects). The one 
way ANOVA was significant, F(2, 58) = 35.33, p < .001. Paired sample t-test showed that 
mean accuracy in the memory baseline condition (0.894) was higher than in the dual-same 
object condition (0.81), t(29) = 6.82, p < .001, 95% C.I.(0.062, 0.115), and the dual-different 
objects condition (0.76), t(29) = 7.51, p < .001, 95% C.I.(0.095, 0.166). Mean accuracy in the 
dual-same object condition was higher than in the dual-different objects condition, t(29) = 
2.48, p < .019, 95% C.I. (0.0074, 0.076). Compared to the memory baseline condition, there 
is a general overall decrease in performance on the color memory task for the dual-same 
object and dual-different objects conditions compared to the baseline condition. In addition, 
performance of the color memory task was affected by whether the properties in the Duncan 
object task with overlapping stimuli are from the same or different objects. Accuracy 
decreased in the dual-different object condition compared to the dual-same object condition. 
Assuming that the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli engages object-based 
attention and that the color memory task engages object STM, this finding suggests that the 
pools of resources engaged by these two cognitive components are similar. The finding in the 
color memory task is similar to the findings of Tan (2008) and consistent with that of 
Matsukura and Vecera (2008).  
Location memory task. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean 
accuracy rates as a function of condition (memory baseline trials, dual task trials with 
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properties from the same object and dual-task trials with properties from different objects). 
The one way ANOVA was significant, F(2, 58) = 12.61, p < .001. Paired sample t-test 
showed that mean accuracy in the memory baseline condition (0.85) was higher than in the 
dual-same object condition (0.78), t(29) = 4.31, p < .001, 95% C.I. (0.039, 0.112), and the 
dual-different objects condition (0.77), t(29) = 3.94, p < .001, 95% C.I. (0.039, 0.123). Mean 
accuracy in the dual-same object and dual-different objects conditions were not different, 
t(29) = 0.33, p > .74. While there was a general overall decrease in performance on the 
location memory task for the dual-task conditions compared to the baseline condition, 
performance on the location memory task was not affected by whether the two properties 
came from the same or different objects in the dual-task conditions. This pattern suggests that 
the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli and the location memory task engaged 
different processing resources. Assuming that the Duncan object task with overlapping 
stimuli engages object-based attention and that the location memory task engages spatial 
STM, this finding suggests that the pools of resources engaged by these two cognitive 
components are to a certain extent dissociable from each other. Just as with the color memory 
task, the findings in the location memory task are similar to the findings of Tan (2008) and 
consistent with those of Matsukura and Vecera (2008). 
 Double memory task. A 3 (Condition: baseline vs. dual-same object vs. dual-different 
objects) x 2 (Probe type: color vs. location) repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean 
accuracy rates. There was a main effect of Condition, F(1, 29) = 29.58, p < .001. A weighted 
contrast analysis showed that the mean accuracy in the baseline condition (0.90) was higher 
than in the dual-same object condition (0.81), t(29) = 5.11, p < .001, 95% C.I. (0.054, 0.127), 
and the dual-different objects condition (0.77), t(29) = 6.75, p < .001, 95% C.I.(0.092, 
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0.171). Mean accuracy in the dual-same object condition also was higher than in the dual-
different objects condition, t(29) = 2.72, p < .011, 95% C.I. (0.010, 0.071). There was no 
difference between the accuracy on the color and location memory probes, F(1, 29) = 0.76, p 
> .39. The Condition x Probe type interaction effect was significant, F(2, 58) = 3.39, p < 
0.041. Pair sampled t-tests revealed no differences in the mean accuracy of the color and 
location memory performance in the baseline condition, t(29) = 0.079, p > .93, 95% C.I. (-
0.056, 0.051), or the dual-same object condition, t(29) = 0.71, p > .48, 95% C.I. (-0.031, 
0.065). However, mean accuracy for the color probes was lower than for location probes in 
the dual-different object condition, t(29) = 2.39, p < .024, 95% C.I. (0.0086, 0.112), showing 
that when object-based attention was engaged in the dual-task condition, selective 
interference on color memory occurred only for the dual-different objects condition. A 
weighted contrast comparison also demonstrated that mean accuracy for the location probes 
in the dual-different objects condition was not different for either color or location probes in 
the dual-same object condition, t(29) = 0.51, p > .61, 95% C.I. (-0.052, 0.031). Overall, the 
findings in the double memory task mirror the findings in the color and location memory 
tasks. The findings show that when object-based attention is engaged, it interferes with object 
STM. This further strengthens the claim that object-based attention and object STM engage 
similar processing resources, and these shared processing resources appear to be dissociable 
from the resources engaged by spatial STM.  
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Task Combinations Including the Duncan Object Task (Separate) 
 
Attention Tasks: Duncan Object Task (Separate) 
 
 Based on the results just described with the Duncan object task with overlapping 
stimuli, one would not expect differences in the performance of the Duncan object task with 
separated stimuli as a function of VSTM task (i.e., memory task). However, one would 
expect to find higher accuracy when subjects reported properties from the same object. The 
accuracy rates were collapsed over first and second report because no or only very small and 
non-predicted differences were found in accuracy in a preliminary analysis. The accuracy 
rate and statistical analysis including the first and second report performance is reported in 
Appendix A. 
 Mean accuracy performance on the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli is 
shown in Figure 11 as a function of type of memory task (between-subjects) as well was 
attention task condition and whether the reported properties were from the same or different 
objects (within-subjects). A separate 2 (Condition: baseline vs. dual-task) x 2 (Properties: 
same object vs. different objects) repeated measures analysis was run on mean accuracy rate 
for each memory task. Just as with the overlapping stimuli, there was a main effect of 
Condition for each type of memory task, in that subjects were more accurate in the baseline 
condition. There also was a main effect of Properties, in that subjects were more accurate 
when they reported properties from the same object. The latter is consistent with the findings 
of previous studies (Vecera & Farah, 1994) in which accuracy of report was lower when the 
properties appeared in different objects. The F ratios and p values for these main effects are 
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summarized in Table 6. No other main and interaction effects were significant, p > .54. Just 
as with the visual search task and the Duncan overlapping objects task, there were no 
selective interference effects as a result of holding different types of information in STM. 
Hence, the focus of the discussions will be on the memory task performance.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean accuracy in the Duncan object task with separated stimuli in the  
                 attention baseline and dual-task conditions for the different memory tasks as a  
      function of whether the reported properties are from the same or different  
     objects in Experiment 1. Left Panel: Color memory task; Center Panel:  
     Location memory task; Right Panel: Double memory task. Error bars denote  
     95% within-subjects confidence interval. 
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Table 6. Summary of Significant Effects for Accuracy on the Duncan Object Task 
  (Separated) 
 
95% difference C.I. Effect Memory Type F ratio p value 
Lower Upper 
          
Color  58.87 .001 0.049 0.084 
Location 33.55 .001 0.041 0.086 
Condition            
(df = 1, 29) 
Dual 45.17 .001 0.033 0.062 
          
Color  67.45 .001 0.069 0.114 
Location 68.40 .001 0.062 0.103 
Properties         
(df = 1, 29) 
Dual 195.35 .001 0.085 0.114 
 
Memory Task 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean accuracy in the memory task in the memory baseline, dual-task same  
                 object and dual-task different objects conditions for subjects performing the  
     Duncan object task with separated stimuli in Experiment 1. Left Panel: Color  
     memory task; Center Panel: Location memory task; Right Panel: Double  
     memory task. Error bars denote 95% within-subjects confidence interval. 
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Mean accuracy on the memory task in each of the task conditions is presented in 
Figure 12. A separate ANOVA examined performance on each memory task. 
Color memory task. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean 
accuracy rates as a function of condition (memory baseline, dual-task trials with properties 
from the same object and dual-task trials with properties from different objects). The one 
way ANOVA was significant, F(2, 58) = 28.04, p < .001. Paired sample t-test showed that 
mean accuracy in the memory baseline condition (0.90) was higher than in the dual-same 
object condition (0.83), t(29) = 4.01, p < .001, 95% C.I.(0.038, 0.116), and the dual-different 
objects condition (0.78), t(29) = 7.70, p < .001, 95% C.I.(0.093, 0.16). Mean accuracy in the 
dual-same object condition was higher than in the dual-different objects condition, t(29) = 
3.26, p < .003, 95% C.I. (0.018, 0.080). Compared to the memory baseline condition, there 
was a general overall decrease in performance in the dual-task conditions. In addition, color 
memory accuracy was affected by whether the reported properties in the Duncan object task 
with separated stimuli came from the same or different objects. Accuracy decreased in the 
dual-different object condition compared to the dual-same object condition. Assuming that an 
additional attentional selection is required when subjects need to report properties from 
different objects and hence object-based attention is engaged to a larger extent, the lower 
performance in dual-different objects condition compared to the dual-same object condition 
suggests that the Duncan object task with separated stimuli and the color memory task 
engages similar processing resources, which are likely to be processing resources engaged by 
object-based attention and object STM.  
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Location memory task. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean 
accuracy rates as a function of condition (memory baseline, dual-task trials with properties 
from the same object and dual-task trials with properties from different objects). The one 
way ANOVA was significant, F(2, 58) = 25.36, p < .001. Paired sample t-test showed that 
mean accuracy in the memory baseline condition (0.88) was higher than in the dual-same 
object condition (0.79), t(29) = 4.88, p < .001, and the dual-different objects condition (0.74), 
t(29) = 6.57, p < .001. Mean accuracy in the dual-same object and dual-different objects 
conditions were not different, t(29) = 2.40, p < .023. Compared to the memory baseline 
condition, there is a general overall decrease in performance on the location memory task for 
the dual-same object and dual-different objects conditions. As with the color memory task, 
accuracy in the location memory task was affected by whether the reported properties in the 
Duncan object task with separated stimuli were from the same or different objects. 
Performance decreased in the dual-different object condition compared to the dual-same 
condition. Because the stimuli were separated in space, there was an additional spatial 
selection when subjects needed to report properties from different objects. Assuming that this 
additional spatial selection engaged spatial attention to a greater extent, the lower 
performance on the dual-different objects condition suggests that the Duncan object task with 
separated stimuli and the location memory task engaged similar processing resources, which 
are likely to be processing resources engaged by spatial attention and spatial STM. Together 
with the findings in the color memory condition, the findings in the location memory 
condition suggest that there is both an object-based and a spatial attentional selection 
component for the Duncan object task with separated stimuli. This is consistent with findings 
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in previous studies claiming independent spatial and object-based effects can be observed 
using a task similar to the Duncan object task with separated stimuli (e.g., Awh et al., 2001). 
Double memory task. A 3 (Condition: baseline vs. dual-same object vs. dual-different 
objects) x 2 (Probe type: color vs. location) repeated measures ANOVA was run on the mean 
accuracy rates. There was a main effect of Condition, F(2, 58) 36.78, p < .001. A weighted 
contrast analysis showed that the mean accuracy in the memory baseline condition (0.86) was 
higher than the dual-same object condition (0.76), t(29) = 5.11, p < .001, 95% C.I. (0.060, 
0.152), and the dual-different objects condition (0.69), t(29) = 7.72, p < .001, 95% 
C.I.(0.126, 0.217). Mean accuracy in the dual-same object condition also was higher than the 
dual-different objects condition, t(29) = 4.35, p < .001, 95% C.I. (0.035, 0.097). There was 
no difference in accuracy on the color and location probes, F(1, 29) = 0.34, p > .56. The 
Condition x Probe type interaction effect also was not significant, F(2, 58) = 0.29, p < .748, 
suggesting similar dual-task decrements for the two type of probes. Overall, the findings with 
the double memory task mirrored those found with the color and location memory task, in 
that the Duncan object task with separated stimuli interfered with both color and location 
memory. Assuming that reporting properties from different objects required both an 
additional spatial and object-based attentional selection, and that both spatial and object-
based attention are engaged to a larger extent when this happens, the findings further 
strengthen the claims that object-based attention engages similar processing resources with 
object STM, that spatial attention engages similar processing resources with spatial STM, 
and that both pools of processing resources are distinct and dissociable from each other.  
The findings in the Duncan object task with separated stimuli also provided evidence 
for two further claims in the literature. One is that spatial and object-based attention can 
 73 
operate within the same selection task (Awh et al., 2001). The other is that spatial attention 
does not override object-based selection when a spatial component was introduced to the 
selection task (Kramer et al., 1997). If object-based selection is overridden by spatial 
attention when the stimuli were separated, then one would expect less interference in the 
color memory task compared to the location memory task. However, this was not the case.  
It must be noted that the findings for the memory tasks in the Duncan object task with 
separated stimuli condition can also be accounted for with a processing difficulty account. If 
one assumes that it is more difficult for subjects to report properties from different objects 
than from the same object, it would not be surprising that lower memory performance was 
found when subjects performed dual-task different objects trials compared to dual-task same 
object trials. While this claim might carry substantial weight if one only considered the 
findings from the Duncan object task with separated stimuli in isolation, this claim loses 
some of its weight when one considers the findings from the visual search task and the 
Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli. If one assumes that it was more difficult to 
search among 12 items compared to 4 items in the visual search task, and it was more 
difficult to report properties from different objects than from the same object in the Duncan 
object task with overlapping stimuli, then one would expect to find lower performance in the 
color memory task in the dual-12 items condition compared to the dual-4 items condition, 
and also lower performance in the location memory task in the dual-different object 
condition compared to the dual-same object condition. While one could claim that it is 
possible that the Duncan object task with separated stimuli is more difficult than the other 
two tasks, and hence the interference in memory task performance manifested as a result, this 
explanation is quite post-hoc and is not parsimonious. Thus, taking the findings of all the 
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conditions in Experiment 1 into account, they strongly support the claims that object-based 
attention and object STM engaged similar processing resources, spatial attention and spatial 
STM engaged similar processing resources, and both sets of processing resources are 
dissociable from each other.  
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CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
Experiment 1 was designed to investigate the relationship between VSTM and 
attention with three different attention task: the visual search task reflecting spatial attention, 
the Duncan (1984) object-based attention task with no spatial component and a modification 
of the Duncan object-based attention task with a spatial component (Vecera & Farah, 1994), 
in which the objects were separated in space. The design allowed comparison to results of 
previous findings (e.g., Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004; Tan, 2008; Woodman 
& Luck, 2004). Taken together, the findings in Experiment 1 suggest that attention and STM 
engage similar processing resources for both the spatial and object-based components. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the relationship between spatial attention and spatial STM is 
relatively well established (e.g., Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman et 
al., 2001; Woodman & Luck, 2004). However, the relationship between object-based 
attention and object STM is less well established due to limited empirical support, in that 
only the Duncan (1984) object task with overlapping stimuli has been used to establish the 
relationship (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008). Hence, the reported relationship 
between object-based attention and object STM might be a task artifact of the Duncan object 
task. Experiment 2 was designed to further examine the relationship between object-based 
attention and object STM with a different object attention task.  
Although the Duncan (1984) object task is well established in demonstrating the 
effects of object-based attention and is often employed in the literature, there is a potential 
problem with using it in the context of investigating the interaction effects between VSTM 
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and attention as was done in Experiment 1. The stimuli presented in the Duncan object task 
are usually brief, presented between 100 ms and 200 ms, and they are masked. The brief 
presentation is because the object task emphasizes accuracy and hence the stimuli need to be 
masked to prevent ceiling performance. However, it is quite possible that the brief 
presentation of the masked stimuli requires subjects to engage some form of object STM 
capacity in order to do the task. That is, the Duncan object task, which was employed as an 
object-based attention task, may also involve object STM.  
The visual search task requires spatially scanning the screen for targets and this is 
more likely to interfere with the spatial STM component rather than the object STM 
component. Previous research failed to obtain an interference effect on the visual search task 
(i.e., on spatial attention) when object VSTM was loaded (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & 
Kim, 2004; Woodman et al., 2001). One possibility is that loading object STM interferes 
with object-based attention (Tan, 2008) or vice-versa (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008) only 
under the condition in which the object-based attention task heavily engages object STM 
capacity, as may be true for the Duncan object task. Although Matsukura and Vecera’s 
finding that the interference effect on spatial STM is larger for a visual search task than for 
the Duncan object task rules out a strict general processing capacity account, it could be the 
case that an object-based attention task interferes with object STM only when the attention 
task itself taxes object STM capacity. It may be that the double dissociation observed by 
Matsukura and Vecera occurs only under these limiting conditions.  
Experiment 2 was designed to further explore the relationship between object-based 
attention and object STM without the limitations just described. This was achieved by 
adopting the Egly et al. (1994) task, which combines a spatial cueing methodology with an 
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object-based selection task. An example of a typical trial in the Egly et al. object task is 
shown in Figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 13. Sample of stimuli and timing for displays in the Egly et al. object task. The  
      example depicts an valid cue condition with a larger square as the target.  
 
The Egly et al. task employs two rectangle outlines arranged either vertically or 
horizontally on the sides of an imaginary square. One end of one rectangle is cued prior to 
the presentation of three distractors and a target. Subjects respond to the target (a larger 
circle/square), which can appear in the cued location or a non-cued location. Invalid cue 
targets, which appear at a non-cued location, can appear either in the same cued object (i.e., 
the other end of the cued rectangle) or in another object (i.e., the equidistant end of the 
uncued rectangle). There are two general findings using this task. First, RT to valid cue 
targets is fastest, indicating both spatial and object-based attention selection effects. This is 
referred to as the validitiy effect. Second, RT to the invalid cue targets in the different object 
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is slower than to the invalid cue targets in the same object, indicating an object-based 
attentional selection effect. This is referred to as the object effect. Because both the validity 
and the object effect in the Egly et al. task reflect both spatial and object-based attention, it is 
an appropriate task to employ in order to investigate the interaction between object attention 
and VSTM. Furthermore, the displays employed in the Egly et al. task are similar to those 
employed in a typical visual search task, in that most of the stimuli (with the exception of the 
spatial cue) remain on the screen until a response is made. Hence, unlike the Duncan object 
task, there is minimal demand on object STM capacity in the Egly et al. task. Examination of 
the differences in the magnitude of the object effect and of the validity effect for within 
versus between objects under conditions in which different types of VSTM are loaded will 
allow a direct comparison of the effect of VSTM on object attention.  
Experiment 2 employed a dual-task paradigm similar to that employed in Experiment 
1, in which groups of subjects were exposed to different memory tasks. The same three 
memory tasks were varied across subjects (color memory, location memory and double 
memory), but all subjects performed the Egly et al. (1994) object task.  As just noted, the 
Egly et al. object task engages both spatial and object-based attention and there are fewer 
demands on object STM than in the Duncan object task. If a similar pattern of results were 
still found in Experiment 2, it would further extend the claims made by Matsukura and 
Vecera (2008) and by Tan (2008).   
The employment of the Egly et al. (1994) object task in Experiment 2 also addressed 
the criticisms for possible confounding variables in Matsukura and Vecera (2008) and 
Experiment 1 of the present study. Although a double dissociation was established in these 
study, the double dissociations were established using different attention tasks. Hence, one 
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can argue that the differences in the interference effects could be due to the procedural 
characteristics of different tasks rather than to the fact that the different tasks engaged the 
different cognitive components. Baddeley (2007) pointed out that when employing the dual-
task paradigm to explore possible interference effects on VSTM, one general difficulty is to 
ensure that the tasks employed are at least somewhat comparable. By using the same 
attention task within the context of the dual-task paradigm in Experiment 2, the problems of 
the confounding variables would be addressed. If a similar pattern of results were found, this 
would provide further evidence to the above claims.  
 Before one could make a prediction on the outcome of the experiment, it is necessary 
to understand how spatial attention and object-based attention might be manifested in the 
Egly et al. object task. In the Egly et al. object task, subjects are always cued to a corner of 
one of the rectangles. Assuming the framework of attentional shift postulated by Posner and 
Petersen (1990; see also Brown & Denney, 2007), attention would be engaged on the spatial 
location of the cue. If the target also appears in the same location, subjects would be faster to 
react to it. However, if the target does not appear in the same location as the cue (i.e., invalid 
cue condition), attention needs to disengage from the location of the cue and shift towards the 
location of the target. In both the invalid-same object and invalid-different object cue 
conditions, it is assumed that a spatial shift is required for attention to shift towards and 
engage onto target location. Because both the target location is equidistant from the cue in 
both the invalid cue conditions, spatial attention should engage approximately the same 
amount of processing resources in both cue conditions. However, the situation is different in 
the case of object-based attention. In the case when the shift is within the same object, 
attention does not need to disengage from the object, but when the shift is towards a different 
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object, attention needs to disengage from the cued object and to engage onto the other object. 
Thus, if one were to define the delay in engagement onto invalid cue targets as the 
‘attentional shifting cost due to an invalid cue’, the attentional shifting cost for the invalid-
same object cue condition would be the result of only an additional spatial attentional shift, 
while the shifting cost for the invalid-different object cue condition would be the result of 
both a spatial and an object-based attentional shift.  
 If one assumes that spatial attention and spatial STM engage similar processing 
resources, then engaging spatial STM should interfere with the spatial shift. Similarly, if one 
assumes that object-based attention and object STM engage similar processing resources, 
then engaging object STM should interfere with the object-based shift. Hence, one would 
predict different patterns of attentional shifting cost in the dual-task condition compared to 
the baseline condition across the memory type conditions. For the color memory condition, 
in which object STM is thought to be engaged, one would predict that the attentional shifting 
cost in the dual-task condition would be larger than the baseline in the invalid-different cue 
trials because an object-based attentional shift only occurs for the invalid-different cue trials. 
For the location memory condition, in which spatial STM is thought to be engaged, one 
would predict that the attentional shifting cost in the dual-task condition would be larger than 
the baseline in both the invalid-same and invalid-different cue trials because spatial 
attentional shift occurs in both conditions. For the double memory condition, in which both 
spatial and object STM are thought to be engaged, one would predict that the attentional 
shifting cost in the dual-task condition would be larger than the baseline in both the invalid-
same and invalid-different cue trials because a spatial attentional shift occurs in both 
conditions. Furthermore, because there is an additional object-based shift required in the 
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invalid-different cue trials, one would predict that the attentional shifting cost in the invalid-
different cue trials of the double memory condition would be larger than that of the color 
memory condition and the location memory condition. Obtaining these above predicted 
results would greatly strengthen the claims that spatial attention and spatial STM engage 
similar processing resources, that object-based attention and object STM engage similar 
processing resources, and that both sets of processing resources are dissociable to a great 
extent.   
To summarize, the purpose of Experiment 2 was to test whether the claims (a) that 
spatial attention and spatial STM share similar processing resources, (b) that object-based 
attention and object STM share similar processing resources, and (c) that both sets of 
processing resources are dissociable would hold true when a different attention task that does 
not heavily engage object-based STM was used in the dual-task paradigm. The predicted 
results of Experiment 2 are summarized in Table 7. 
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Method 
 
Subjects and Design 
 
Subjects were 144 students with normal or corrected-to-normal vision who 
participated for course credit after giving informed consent. The data from 16 additional 
subjects were discarded due to low accuracy rates ( < 70%) in the Egly et al. (1994) object 
task. Similar to Experiment 1, three types of memory task (i.e., location, color and dual-
memory) were employed. However, only the Egly et al. object task was employed as the 
attention task. Forty-eight subjects were randomly assigned to each of the memory tasks. 
Within each memory task condition, there were three task conditions: memory baseline, 
attention baseline and dual-task. The order of the three task conditions was counterbalanced 
across subjects within each memory task.  
 
Tasks 
 
 For all tasks, unless otherwise noted, the displays consisted of white figures on a 
black background. This was because previous studies also employed similar stimuli (e.g., 
Egly et al., 1994; Hecht & Vecera, 2007). The experiment was written and presented using 
EPRIME (www.psnet.com). The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch Dell Monitor. Subjects 
viewed the display freely from approximately 23.6" and wore sound deadening earmuffs 
throughout the experiment.  
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 Memory task. The memory tasks were similar to Experiment 1, with the following 
exceptions. First, the memory array was increased from two to four. This was because an 
earlier study by Lee and Vecera (2005) with a similar procedure employed four items. Thus, 
subjects were shown four squares instead of two squares during the memory array frame. 
Second, the color of the location probe was changed from black to white. As in Experiment 
1, subjects were instructed to remember the color, location or both color and location 
information about the items in the memory array so that they could correctly respond to the 
memory probe presented at the end of the trial.  
 Attention task (Egly et al. object task). Figure 13 (page 71) illustrates an example of 
the displays comprising the stimuli used for the Egly et al. (1994) object task and the 
procedural outline of the task. The initial display consisted of a fixation cross and two 
rectangles. The fixation cross was 0.16" x 0.16" (visual angle = 0.40º x 0.40º). The two 
outline rectangles were 0.41" (visual angle = 1.0º) wide by 2.46" (visual angle = 6.0º) long. 
The rectangles were aligned either horizontally or vertically, and the ends of each rectangle 
were equidistant from one another and fell 4.2º from fixation. 
 Subjects were spatially cued to a location on one of the rectangles by brightening the 
edges at that end of a rectangle with a 0.04" (visual angle = 0.10º) thick white line. The cue 
appeared for 50 ms immediately prior to onset of the target display and could appear at any 
of the four ends of the rectangles. The target and three distractors, which were all white 
outline circles or squares, were then presented one at each of the four ends of the rectangles. 
Two circles and two squares appeared on each trial. The target stimulus was a larger shape 
0.37" in diameter (visual angle = 0.90º). The distractors were all smaller shapes, 0.21" in 
diameter (visual angle = 0.5º). 
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 On any trial, the target could appear in three possible locations: the cued location (i.e., 
valid trials), the uncued end of the cued rectangle (i.e., invalid same-object trials), or the 
uncued rectangle (i.e., invalid different-object trials). When the target appeared in the uncued 
rectangle, it always appeared in the end that was closest to the cue, rather than the end that 
was diagonally across from the cued location. As a result, both invalid target locations were 
equidistant from the cued location. Valid trials occurred on 60% of all trials, and each of the 
invalid conditions appeared on 20% of the trials.  
After the 500 ms blank delay period following the offset of the memory stimuli, a 
fixation cross was presented for 500 ms, followed by the two rectangles. After the rectangles 
were presented for 500 ms, the spatial cue appeared for 50 ms. Immediately after the offset of 
the cue, one target and three distractors were presented for 2000 ms, or until subjects made a 
response. Subjects pressed the “1” key if the target was a large circle and the “2” key if the 
target was a large square. If subjects failed to make a response for a trial, it was logged as an 
incorrect response. Subjects received visual feedback in the form of a red cross for 250 ms 
whenever a wrong response was made. A blank frame of 250 ms was then presented when a 
correct response was made. Subjects performed a total of 160 trials in the attention baseline 
and 160 trials in the dual-task conditions. Each subject also performed 24 unanalyzed 
practice trials before the start of the experimental trials. 
 
Procedure 
 
 The general procedure for Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1 in that 
there was articulatory suppression (Besner et al., 1981) throughout the experimental trials, 
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and the order of the task conditions (attention baseline, memory baseline and dual-task) was 
counterbalanced over subjects. Subjects were given 12 practice trials in each of the task 
conditions in order to familiarize them with the presentation sequence of the task and the 
display frames to which they should respond depending on task condition. As in Experiment 
1, a white X was superimposed on displays that should be ignored during the baseline 
conditions. Instructions stressed both speed and accuracy for all tasks.  
 
Experiment 2: Results and Discussion 
 
 In Experiment 2, there were three different memory task groups performing the same 
attention task (i.e., Egly et al. object task). Unlike Experiment 1, the interesting results were 
found in the attention task rather than in the memory task. Specifically, the attentional 
shifting costs varied as a function of VSTM loading. Hence, the focus of the results and 
discussion is on the effect of the different memory tasks on attention shifting within or 
between objects in the Egly et al. object task. Performance on the Egly et al. object task in 
terms of accuracy and RT in both the attention baseline and dual-task conditions will first be 
presented. The attention shifting cost for each memory task condition in both the attention 
baseline and dual-task conditions will then be examined in order to investigate the effects of 
loading different types of VSTM on attention shifting. Finally, performance on the memory 
task in both the memory baseline and dual-task conditions for the different memory 
conditions will be examined.  
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Egly et al. Object Task 
 
Overall Performance 
 
 Accuracy. Mean accuracy in the Egly et al. object task is shown in Table 8 as a 
function of type of memory task (between subjects) and condition and type of target (within-
subjects). Separate 2 (Condition: baseline vs. dual-task) x 3 (Cue type: valid vs. invalid-same 
vs. invalid-different) repeated measures ANOVAs were run for each memory task group. 
Both accuracy rates and RT in the Egly object task were examined. For each memory task, 
the main effect of Cue type was significant, in that subjects were more accurate in the valid 
trials than the invalid-same and invalid-different trials, but there were no differences between 
the invalid-same and invalid-different trials. The F ratios and p values for these main effects 
are summarized in Table 9 (bottom). Also, the main effect of Condition was significant for 
both the location memory task, F(1, 47) = 4.36, p < .042, and the double memory task, F(1, 
47) = 5.44, p < .024. No other main or interaction effects were significant, p > .30. 
 
 
Table 8. Mean Accuracy as a Function of Memory Task and Condition in the Egly et al. 
    Object Task 
 
 Baseline Dual Task 
 Valid 
Invalid-
Same 
Invalid-
Different Valid 
Invalid-
Same 
Invalid-
Different 
Color 0.93 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.89 
Location 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.88 0.89 
Double 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.93 0.90 0.89 
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Table 9. Summary of Significant Cueing Main Effect on Accuracy in the Egly et al.  
  Object Task 
 
95% difference C.I. 
Valid vs.         
Invalid Same 
Valid vs.       
Invalid Different 
Invalid Same vs. 
Invalid Different Effect 
Memory 
Type 
F ratio p value 
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Color  13.13 .001 0.011 0.037 0.019 0.049 -0.023 0.002 
Location 7.97 .001 0.014 0.047 0.01 0.04 -0.012 0.023 Cue           (df = 2, 94) 
Dual 9.14 .001 0.013 0.046 0.013 0.045 -0.014 0.016 
 
 RT. Mean RT in the Egly et al. object task is shown in Figure 14 as a function of type 
of memory task (between subjects) and condition and type of target (within subjects). RTs 
below 200 ms or above 2000 ms ( < 2% of the data) and RTs for incorrect trials were 
excluded from analysis.  
 
 
Figure 14. Mean RT in the Egly et al. object task as a function of condition and cue  
     validity for the different memory task conditions in Experiment 2. Left Panel:  
     Color memory; Center Panel: Location memory; Right Panel: Double memory. 
     Error bars denote 95% within-subjects confidence interval. 
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For each memory task, the main effect of Condition was significant, in that subjects 
were slower in the in the dual-task condition compared to the baseline condition. The main 
effect of Cue type also was significant. Paired t-tests showed that RT in the valid trials was 
faster than both the invalid-same and invalid-different trials, and RT in the invalid-same trials 
was faster than the invalid-different trials. This is a typical finding for the Egly object task 
(e.g., Egly et al., 1994; Lavie & Driver, 1996; Shomstein & Behrmann, 2008). The Condition 
x Cue type interaction effect also was significant, in that when the difference in RT between 
the dual-task condition and the baseline condition was considered, there was no difference 
between the valid and invalid-same trials, but the difference in RT for the invalid-different 
trials was larger than for the other two types of trials. The F ratios and p values for these 
main and interaction effects are summarized in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Summary of Significant Effects for RT in the Egly et al. Object Task 
 
95% difference C.I. (Baseline vs. Dual-Task) Effect Memory Type F ratio 
p 
value Lower Upper 
          
Color  15.36 .001 34.28 106.59 
Location 47.45 .001 86.95 158.68 
Task        
(df = 1, 47) 
Dual 27.75 .001 71.59 160.04 
      
Valid vs.         
Invalid Same 
Valid vs.        
Invalid Different 
Invalid Same vs. 
Invalid Different 
    Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Color  102.7 .001 58.85 90.06 93.33 130.98 24.58 50.82 
Location 130.31 .001 59.03 89.66 97.31 126.87 25.38 50.11 
Cue         
(df = 2, 94) 
Dual 101.57 .001 60.28 95.08 101.36 141.16 29.32 57.84 
    
Valid vs.         
Invalid Same 
Valid vs.        
Invalid Different 
Invalid Same vs. 
Invalid Different 
    Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Color  3.55 .033 -15.50 10.31 3.78 26.71 0.12 25.18 
Location 3.06 .052 -12.28 12.27 -0.24 27.20 1.53 25.44 
Task x 
Cue       
(df = 2, 94) 
Dual 10.44 .001 -11.72 10.77 11.12 37.41 11.84 37.64 
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Attentional Shifting Cost 
 
To further examine the Condition x Cue type interaction effect, the attentional 
shifting cost due to each type of invalid cue was calculated for each subject. The attentional 
shifting cost was calculated by subtracting the mean RT for the valid cue trials from the 
respective mean RT of the invalid cue trials. Thus, there was an attention-shifting cost for 
invalid-same trials and an attention shifting cost for invalid-different trials. Attention shifting 
cost was calculated for each condition (baseline and dual-task). Mean attentional shifting 
costs under each memory task are shown in Figure 15.  
 
 
Figure 15. Mean attentional shifting cost for the invalid trials in the Egly et al. object task 
      as a function of condition and memory task in Experiment 2. Left Panel: Color 
      memory; Center Panel: Location memory; Right Panel: Double memory. Error 
      bars denote 95% within-subjects confidence interval. 
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 As previously described, if the memory task engaged the same processing resources 
required for the attentional shift, it would interfere with the attentional shift in the dual-task 
condition relative to the baseline condition. Interference with the shift would increase the 
cost associated with the attention shift. A spatial shift should occur on all invalid cue trials, 
but an object-based attention shift should only occur on the invalid-different trials.  
Color memory task. A 2 (Condition: baseline vs. dual-task) x 2 (Target location: same 
object vs. different object) repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze the attentional 
shifting cost. The attentional shifting cost was marginally larger in the dual-task condition 
(102 ms) than the baseline condition (84 ms), F(1, 47) = 2.94, p < .093, 95% C.I. (-3.1, 38.8), 
and larger when the target appeared in the different object (112 ms) compared to when it 
appeared in the same object (74 ms), F(1, 47) = 33.42, p < .001, 95% C.I. (24.5, 50.8). The 
Condition x Target location interaction effect was significant, F(1, 47) = 4.12, p < .048. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that the attentional shifting cost for the same object condition 
was similar in both the baseline (71 ms) and dual-task conditions (77 ms), t(47) = 0.405, p > 
.68, 95% C.I. (-31.0, 20.6). However, the attentional shifting cost for the different object 
condition was larger in the dual-task condition (127 ms) compared to the baseline condition 
(96 ms), t(47) = 2.68, p < .01, 95% C.I. (7.6, 53.4). This finding is consistent with the 
predicted results. Attentional shifting cost was larger in the dual-task condition only when the 
target appeared in a different object. Assuming that the color memory task engaged object 
STM and that object STM and object-based attention engaged similar processing resources, 
there should be an interference effect in the dual-task condition only when an additional 
object-based attentional shift is required, which only occurs for the different object condition  
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Location memory task. A 2 (Condition: baseline vs. dual-task) x 2 (Object: same 
object vs. different object) repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze the attentional 
shifting cost. The attentional shifting cost was larger when the target appeared in the different 
object (112 ms) compared to when it appeared in the same object (74 ms), F(1, 47) = 37.68, p 
< .001, 95% C.I. (25.38, 50.11). The Condition x Target location interaction effect was 
significant, F(1, 47) = 5.15, p < .028. Pairwise comparisons showed that the attentional 
shifting cost for the same object condition was similar in both the baseline (74 ms) and dual-
task conditions (74 ms), t(47) = 0.001, p > .99, 95% C.I. (-24.54, 24.55). However, the 
attentional shifting cost for the different object condition was larger in the dual-task 
condition (126 ms) compared to the baseline condition (97 ms), t(47) = 1.977, p < .054, 95% 
C.I. (-0.5, 54.4). This finding is inconsistent with the predicted results. Attentional shifting 
cost was larger in the dual-task condition only for the different object condition but not for 
the same object condition. Assuming that the location memory task engaged spatial STM and 
that spatial STM and spatial attention engaged similar processing resources, there should 
have been an interference effect in the dual-task condition when an additional spatial 
attentional shift was required, which occurred for both the same and different object 
conditions. 
Double memory task. A 2 (Condition: baseline vs. dual-task) x 2 (Target location: 
same object vs. different object) repeated measures ANOVA was used to analyze the 
attentional shifting cost. The attentional shifting cost was larger in the dual-task condition 
(111 ms) compared to the baseline condition (88 ms), F(1, 47) = 5.30, p < .026, 95% C.I. 
(3.0, 44.6), and when the target appeared in the different object (121 ms) was larger than 
when it appeared in the same object (78 ms), F(1, 47) = 37.80, p < .001, 95% C.I. (29.3, 
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57.8). The Condition x Target location interaction effect was significant, F(1, 47) = 14.90, p 
< .001. Pairwise comparisons showed that the attentional shifting cost for the same object 
condition was similar in both the baseline (78 ms) and dual-task conditions (77 ms), t(47) = 
0.085, p > .933, 95% C.I. (-21.5, 23.4). However, the attentional shifting cost for the 
different object condition was larger in the dual-task condition (146 ms) compared to the 
baseline condition (97 ms), t(47) = 3.71, p < .001, 95% C.I. (3.71, 22.25).  
The numerical value of the attentional shifting cost in the different object condition of 
the double memory condition (146 ms) was larger than in the color memory condition (127 
ms) and the location memory condition (126 ms), but the difference was not reliable. 
Because a difference was expected, a 3 (Memory type: color vs. location vs. double) x 2 
(Condition: baseline vs. dual task) x 2 (Target location: same object vs. different object) 
mixed ANOVA with Memory type as a between-subject variable was run on the attentional 
shifting cost. The mixed ANOVA failed to find a significant three-way interaction effect, 
F(2, 141) = 1.19, p > .30. This suggested that the difference in attentional shifting cost 
between the baseline and the dual-task condition in the different object condition did not 
differ significantly across Memory type, despite the fact that the attentional shifting cost was 
numerically larger. There are two possible interpretations for this numerically larger but 
statistically non-significant difference in attentional shifting cost. The first possibility is that 
there is a lack of power. In the present study, 48 subjects were run in each condition. 
Although this is a large number for the Egly et al. object task (usually around 20 subjects are 
run in studies using the Egly et al. object task), a power analysis of the difference in the 
attentional shifting cost between the dual-task and baseline conditions using the sample 
standard deviation (88) as an estimate of the population standard deviation revealed that 598 
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subjects would be required for each condition to get a significantly larger attentional shifting 
cost in the double memory condition of the magnitude observed. Attentional shifting cost is a 
difference score and there was high variability in the score both within each memory task and 
across memory tasks and therefore a large number of subjects would be required to detect a 
real difference. One could address this issue with a within-subjects experimental design, 
which might be more sensitive to a real difference.  
The second possibility is that the numerically larger attentional shifting cost might be 
due to statistical noise. In order to investigate this possibility, the difference in attentional 
shifting cost between the dual-task and baseline condition for each subject was computed. In 
this case, a negative difference would imply that loading STM did not interfere with the 
attentional shifts, while a positive difference would imply that loading STM interfered with 
the attentional shifts. The histogram distribution of this difference was then plotted as a 
function of target location (i.e., same object versus different objects) and the memory task 
(i.e., color, location and double memory task). These histograms are presented in Figure 16. 
Examining the histogram distributions allows one to get a better idea of whether the larger 
attentional shifting cost in the double memory condition might be due to statistical noise. An 
obvious indication would be the existence of outliers, which could increase the variance 
and/or mean attentional shifting cost in the different memory conditions. Depending on 
which memory task condition the outliers appeared, this could either mask any possible real 
differences between the conditions, or increase the level of statistical noise in the data.  
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Figure 16. Histogram plots of difference in attentional shifting cost between the dual-task 
     and baseline conditions as a function of target location and memory task. The  
     panels on the left column denote histograms in the different object condition  
     and the panels on the right column denote histograms in the same object  
     condition. The panels in the first row denote histograms in the color memory  
     condition. The panels in the second row denote histograms in the double  
     memory condition. The panels in the third row denotes histogram in the  
     location memory condition.  
 
From the histograms, it can be seen that the distributions for the different object 
condition is shifted more to the right compared to same object condition. This is consistent 
with the finding that the attentional shifting cost in the different object condition was larger 
than in the same object condition. However, the histogram distributions for the different 
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object condition in the double memory task did not show any indication of positive outliers. 
This suggests the numerically larger attentional shifting cost in the double memory condition 
was not due to the influence of outlier points. A further examination of the histogram 
distributions in the different object condition revealed no obvious difference between them, 
in that the shape of the distributions for the three memory conditions look highly similar. 
This could be due to the high variability in the data. While the examination of the histogram 
distributions ruled out the hypothesis that the numerically larger attentional shifting cost in 
the double memory condition was due to outlier points, it still does not allow one to 
unequivocally reject either interpretation. In other words, the numerically larger but 
statistically non-significant attentional shifting cost in the double memory condition could 
either be due to a lack of power, or due to statistical noise.  
The lack of power interpretation would make the finding in the double memory 
condition partly consistent with the predicted results, while the statistical noise interpretation 
would make the finding in the double memory condition inconsistent with the predicted 
result. The null finding does not unequivocally support either interpretation. The two 
interpretations lead to different conclusions about whether the processing resources engaged 
by spatial attention and spatial STM are dissociable from those engaged by object-based 
attention and object STM. This issue will be explored further in the General Discussion 
section under the heading ‘Dissociable Sets of Processing Resources?’, where the 
implications of adopting either interpretation are discussed and a further study is proposed to 
differentiate between the interpretations.  
Similar to the findings with the location memory task, attentional shifting cost was 
larger in the dual-task condition only for the different object condition. Assuming that the 
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location memory task engaged spatial STM and that spatial STM and spatial attention 
engaged similar processing resources, there should be an interference effect in the dual-task 
condition when an additional spatial attentional shift is required, which occurred for both the 
same and different object conditions. The pattern of results suggests that attentional selection 
for spatial locations within the same object might be facilitated (e.g., Müller and 
Kleinschimdt, 2003) and is inconsistent with the predicted findings. This issue will be further 
explored in the General Discussion section under the heading ‘Modulation of Spatial 
Attention Within an Object’.  
One might argue that a processing difficulty account could explain the findings in 
Experiment 2. The numerically larger attentional shifting cost in the different object 
condition of the double memory task might be due to the fact that it was more difficult for 
subjects to maintain both color and location information compared to maintaining either the 
color or location information (see Figure 15, page 85). This explanation is unlikely because if 
it were true, one also would expect a larger attention shifting cost for the same object 
condition in the double memory task. Of course, one could argue that spatial attentional 
selection within the same object is facilitated and hence a processing difficulty argument 
need not apply. However, this account is post-hoc and less parsimonious than the offered 
explanation. Furthermore, mean accuracy in the Egly et al. object task did not differ in the 
invalid same and invalid different trials for any memory tasks and when the overall mean 
RTs were examined (see Figure 14, page 83), subjects were slower in the location memory 
task. Hence, if the processing difficulty account were correct, one would expect a larger 
attentional shifting cost, either numerically or significantly, to manifest in the location 
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memory task condition rather than the double memory task. This was clearly not the case. 
Based on these results, the processing difficulty account is rejected.  
 
Memory Task Performance 
 
Mean accuracy performance for each memory task is shown in Figure 17 as a 
function of condition. 
 
 
Figure 17. Mean accuracy in the memory task in the memory baseline, dual-task  
      valid, dual-task invalid-same and dual-task invalid-different conditions in  
      Experiment 2. Left Panel: Color memory task; Center Panel: Location  
      memory task; Right Panel: Double memory task. Error bars denote 95%  
      within-subjects confidence interval. 
 
Color memory task. A one-way repeated measures ANVOA was run on mean 
accuracy as a function of condition (baseline, dual-valid, dual-invalid-same and dual-invalid-
different). The one way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 141) = 17.92, p < .001. Paired sample 
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comparisons showed higher mean accuracy for the baseline condition than the three dual-task 
conditions, which did not differ. The test statistics for these comparisons are summarized in 
Table 11 (top).  
 
Table 11. Summary of Paired Comparisons for Accuracy in Memory Tasks 
Paired Sample Comparisons 95% Difference C.I. 
 
 t value p value Lower Upper 
      
Baseline vs. Valid 6.90 .001 0.057 0.105 
Baseline vs. Invalid-Same 5.72 .001 0.062 0.13 
Baseline vs. Invalid-Different 5.21 .001 0.04 0.091 
Valid vs. Invalid-Same 1.07 .29 -0.014 0.044 
Valid vs. Invalid-Different 1.21 .23 -0.04 0.01 
 
 
 
Color 
 
 
 
Invalid-Same vs. Different 1.91 .062 -0.063 0.0016 
      
Baseline vs. Valid 7.29 .001 0.058 0.102 
Baseline vs. Invalid-Same 6.82 .001 0.069 0.126 
Baseline vs. Invalid-Different 5.96 .001 0.064 0.129 
Valid vs. Invalid-Same 1.34 .18 -0.009 0.043 
Valid vs. Invalid-Different 1.20 .23 -0.011 0.043 
 
 
 
Location 
 
 
 
Invalid-Same vs. Different 0.09 .92 -0.03 0.027 
      
Baseline vs. Valid 3.81 .001 0.026 0.084 
Baseline vs. Invalid-Same 3.29 .002 0.021 0.088 
Baseline vs. Invalid-Different 4.27 .001 0.035 0.097 
Valid vs. Invalid-Same 0.001 .99 -0.026 0.026 
Valid vs. Invalid-Different 0.949 .34 -0.013 0.035 
 
 
Double 
 
 
 
Invalid-Same vs. Different 0.805 .42 -0.017 0.039 
 
Location memory task. A one-way repeated measures ANVOA was run on mean 
accuracy as a function of condition (baseline, dual valid, dual invalid-same and dual invalid-
different). The one way ANOVA was significant, F(3, 141) = 22.67, p < .001. Similar to the 
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color memory task, paired sample comparisons showed higher mean accuracy for the 
baseline condition than the three dual-task conditions, which did not differ. The test statistics 
for these comparisons are summarized in Table 11 (middle).  
Double memory task. A 2 (Probe type: color vs. location) x 4 (Condition: baseline vs. 
dual valid vs. dual invalid-same vs. dual invalid different) repeated measures ANOVA was 
used to analyze subjects’ mean accuracy rates. There was a main effect of Condition, F(3, 
141) = 8.58, p < .001. Weighted contrast analysis showed higher mean accuracy for the 
baseline condition than the other three dual-task conditions, but the differences between the 
three dual-task conditions were not significant, replicating the findings in the color and 
location memory tasks. The test statistics for the weighted contrast analysis are summarized 
in Table 11 (bottom). The main effect of Probe type was not significant, F(1, 47) = 1.51, p > 
.22. The Condition x Probe type interaction effect also was not significant, F(3, 141) = 0.796, 
p > .49.  
 Generally, for all the memory tasks, the mean accuracy in the baseline condition was 
higher than in the dual-task conditions and there were no differences among the different 
dual-task conditions. In other words, unlike the visual search task and the Duncan object 
tasks in Experiment 1, there was no selective interference on the different dual-task 
conditions by the Egly et al. object task. There was no selective interference on the location 
memory probes when spatial attention was more heavily engaged and there was no selective 
interference on the object memory probes when object attention was more heavily engaged. 
Differences in requirements for the different tasks, such as the number of responses and the 
method of stimuli presentation, might be responsible for the different outcomes. This will be 
discussed in the General Discussion under the heading ‘Locus of Interference’.  
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Overall, the findings in Experiment 2 were not entirely consistent with the findings in 
Experiment 1. First, neither object STM or spatial STM were taxed by the attention task, 
meaning that the selective interference did not show up on the memory accuracy 
performance in the dual-task condition. Second, when the Egly et al. object task was used, in 
which a spatial shift was required on some trials and both a spatial shift and an object-based 
shift were required on other trials, the pattern of interference did not entirely agree with the 
claims that were supported in Experiment 1. As Experiment 2 was specifically designed to 
address methodological issues concerning Experiment 1, these findings suggest that the 
findings in Experiment 1 must be treated with caution. 
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CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 The present study examined several claims regarding the relationship between spatial 
and object-based attention and spatial and object STM by employing different combinations 
of attention and memory tasks within the context of a dual-task paradigm. In Experiment 1, 
three types of attention tasks were employed, namely (a) the visual search task, which is 
thought to engage spatial attention, (b) the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli, 
which is thought to engage object-based attention, and (c) the Duncan object task with 
separated stimuli, which is thought to engage both spatial and object-based attention. Three 
different memory tasks also were employed, namely (a) the color memory task, which is 
thought to engage object STM, (b) the location memory task, which is thought to engage 
spatial STM, and (c) the double memory task, which is thought to engage both spatial and 
object STM. In Experiment 2, the same memory tasks were used, and the Egly et al. (1994) 
object task was employed as the attentional task. In this task, no shift of attention is thought 
to be required on valid trials, a spatial shift is thought to be required on invalid same-object 
trials, and both a spatial and an object-based shift are thought to be required on invalid 
different-object trials.  
The claims examined in the present study included: (a) spatial attention and spatial 
STM engage similar processing resources, (b) object-based attention and object STM engage 
similar processing resources, and (c) these two sets of processing resources are dissociable 
from each other. While the claim that spatial attention and spatial STM engage similar 
processing resources that are dissociable from those engaged by object STM is generally 
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accepted and supported by several studies (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004; 
Woodman et al., 2001; Woodman & Luck, 2004), the claim that object-based attention and 
object STM engage similar processing resources that are dissociable from those engaged by 
spatial STM is less supported (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008). Thus, the present 
study focused primarily on the claim that object-based attention and object STM engage 
similar processing resources dissociable from those engaged by spatial attention and spatial 
STM.  
 The two studies supporting the claim that object-based attention and object STM 
share similar processing resources (i.e., Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008) used the 
Duncan (1984) object task to engage object-based attention. There are at least two concerns 
with employing the Duncan object task as a means to engage object-based attention in a dual-
task paradigm. First, the Duncan object task does not have a spatial component, so one is not 
able to examine whether object STM is affected by engaging object-based attention when the 
task includes a spatial component (e.g., Awh et al., 2001; Vecera & Farah, 1994). Second, 
the Duncan object task places heavy demands on object STM because stimulus presentation 
is brief and masked. In other words, the Duncan object task might interfere with a memory 
task that engages object STM not because the Duncan object task engages object-based 
attention, but because it engages object STM. These concerns limit the validity of the 
conclusions from the studies that claimed object-based attention and object STM engage 
similar processing resources. The first concern was addressed in both Experiments 1 and 2 in 
the present study by including a spatial component in the tasks thought to engage object-
based attention. The second concern was addressed in Experiment 2, where the stimuli were 
not masked and hence placed little demands on object STM.  
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 The present study also was designed to address a methodological problem related to 
the claim that the processing resources thought to engage spatial attention and spatial STM 
are dissociable from the processing resources thought to engage object-based attention and 
object STM. The study that provided support for this claim was Matsukura and Vecera 
(2008). They demonstrated a double dissociation between the two sets of processing 
resources with a combination of attention and memory tasks in a dual-task paradigm. 
However, while the memory tasks varied only in content and not procedure (i.e., location and 
color memory tasks), the attention tasks were fundamentally different. The task thought to 
engage spatial attention (i.e., visual search task) required a single speeded response and did 
not require that the information be stored in VSTM and the task thought to engage object-
based attention (i.e., Duncan object task) required two unspeeded responses to briefly 
presented, masked, stimuli that needed to be maintained in VSTM. This raises the possibility 
that the double dissociation may have been due to some of the procedural differences. The 
present study addressed this problem by using a single attention task in Experiment 2 (i.e., 
the Egly et al. object task) in which both a spatial and an object-based effect could be 
examined.  
 The results of Experiment 1, in which accuracy in the different memory tasks was 
selectively impaired by the different attention tasks, generally support the claims examined in 
the present study. The visual search task interfered with the location memory task, in that 
accuracy on the location memory task decreased when the number of items in the visual 
search display increased from 4 to 12 (i.e., it decreased when spatial attention was more 
engaged). This result supports the claim that spatial attention and spatial STM engage similar 
processing resources. The color memory task did not vary as a function of the number of 
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items in the visual search task. This result supports the claim that the processing resources 
shared by spatial attention and spatial STM were dissociable from those engaged by object 
STM. The Duncan (1984) object task with overlapping stimuli interfered with the color 
memory task, in that accuracy on the color memory task was lower in the different object 
than the same object condition (i.e., it decreased when object-based attention was more 
engaged). This result supports the claim that object-based attention and object STM engage 
similar processing resources. Accuracy on the location memory task did not vary as a 
function of same or different object in the Duncan object task with overlapping stimuli. This 
result supports the claim that the processing resources shared by object-based attention and 
object STM were dissociable from those engaged by spatial STM. The Duncan object task 
with separated stimuli interfered with both the color and location memory tasks, in that both 
the color and memory accuracy decreased as both object-based and spatial attention were 
engage. Furthermore, the same pattern of results was replicated in the double memory task 
for all three attention tasks, providing further support for the model shown in Figure 1 (page 
28).  
 The results in Experiment 2 were less straightforward. Although RT in the Egly et al. 
(1994) object task was slowed by the different memory tasks (i.e., there was a general dual-
task decrement), the pattern of results was not fully in line with the predictions based on the 
claims examined in the present study. If the model shown in Figure 1 (page 28) were true, 
then loading of object STM should interfere with an object-based attentional shift, leading to 
an increased attentional shifting cost in the dual-task different condition when the target was 
in a different object from the cue. Similarly, the loading of spatial STM should interfere with 
a spatial attentional shift, leading to increased attentional shifting cost in both the dual-task 
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same and different conditions (because each requires a spatial shift). Furthermore, if the two 
sets of processing resources are dissociable from each other, then when both object and 
spatial STM were engaged in the double memory task, the increase in attentional shifting 
cost for the different object condition would be larger than when either just spatial STM or 
just object STM was engaged.  
 In contrast to the predictions, the results of Experiment 2 showed that loading STM 
had no effect on attentional shifting cost when the target appeared in the same object as the 
cue. That is, the dual-task shifting cost did not differ from the baseline shifting cost with the 
color memory task, the location memory task and the double memory task. Loading object 
STM, spatial STM or both object and spatial STM had no impact on shifting spatial attention 
within an object. While no increase in attentional shifting cost in the dual-task condition was 
expected when object STM was engaged, because no object-based attentional shift was 
required when shifting within an object, an increase in attentional shifting cost was expected 
when spatial STM was engaged (i.e., with the location and double memory tasks). The results 
showed that spatial attentional shifts within an object were independent of VSTM loading 
under the conditions examined. Assuming that the resources engaged by object STM and 
spatial STM are dissociable and that engaging object STM does not interfere with spatial 
attentional shifts, the findings in the same object condition in Experiment 2 suggest that 
when a spatial attentional shift occurs within the context of an object, it does not tap into the 
same processing resources required by either object STM or spatial STM. In other words, 
shifting locations within an object appears to be fundamentally different from shifting 
locations between objects.   
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When the target appeared in the different object from the cue (thus requiring both a 
spatial and an object-based attentional shift), the results were consistent with the predictions 
for the color and location memory tasks, in that there was an increase in attentional shifting 
cost to a different object when either object or spatial STM was loaded. These findings 
support the claims that object-based attention and object STM engage similar processing 
resources and that spatial attention and spatial STM engage similar processing resources.  
The evidence supporting the claim that both sets of processing resources were 
dissociable was equivocal. The prediction was that if both sets of processing resources were 
dissociable, then when both object STM and spatial STM were loaded in the double memory 
task, the attentional shifting cost would be larger than in the color memory task, in which 
only object STM was loaded, or the location memory task, in which only spatial STM was 
loaded. While the cost of attentional shifting with the double memory task was numerically 
larger than with either the color or the location memory task, the difference was not 
statistically significant. Two possible interpretations were offered for the numerically larger 
but non-significant attentional shifting cost in the double memory task. The first 
interpretation was that because of the high level of variance associated with subjects’ 
performance in the Egly et al. object (1994) task, there was a lack of power to detect a real 
difference. However, it was noted that 48 subjects were run with each memory task, and that 
this is a large sample size for most experiments of this type. The second interpretation was 
that the numerically larger attentional shifting cost with the double memory task was not 
statistically significant because it was not a real difference.  
The two interpretations of the results for the double memory task in Experiment 2 
lead to conclusions that are at odds with each other. If the first interpretation were correct, 
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one would conclude that both sets of processing resources were dissociable and independent 
from each other. In contrast, if the second interpretation were correct, one would conclude 
that the two sets of processing resources are not completely dissociable from each other. In 
the next section, I shall discuss the implications of each possible conclusion and propose a 
study that would be able to distinguish between them. 
 
Dissociable Sets of Processing Resources? 
 
 The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to provide further empirical support for the 
claim that object-based attention and object STM engage similar processing resources. To a 
certain extent, this claim was supported by the findings with the color memory task. 
However, Experiment 2 was also designed to investigate whether there was support for the 
claim that the set of processing resources engaged by object-based attention and object STM 
are independent and dissociable from the set of processing resources engaged by spatial 
attention and spatial STM. As mentioned in the previous section, the results in Experiment 2 
were equivocal towards this claim, mainly due to the difficulty in interpreting whether the 
cost of shifting attention to a different object while doing the double memory task was larger 
than while doing either the color memory task or the location memory task.  
 Interpreting the numerically larger attentional shifting cost in the different object 
condition as a real difference means that there was interference with both the object-based 
and spatial attentional shifts from jointly loading spatial and object STM. Thus, the findings 
in Experiment 2 would be consistent with those in Experiment 1. The findings would support 
the relationship between visual attention and VSTM that is illustrated in Figure 1 (page 28). 
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That is, there are two sets of processing resources that are independent and dissociable from 
each other.  
The alternative interpretation, that there was no difference in the attentional shifting 
cost across the three memory tasks means that loading object STM, spatial STM or both 
object and spatial STM produced the same level of interference on the attentional shift in the 
different object condition. While the model in Figure 1 (page 28) does not make a claim 
about whether the attentional shifting cost would be different between the color memory task 
and the location memory task, it does predict that the attentional shifting cost would be larger 
with the double memory task. There are two ways to reconcile the model illustrated in Figure 
1 (page 28) and the failure to find a larger attentional shifting cost with the double memory 
task. Assuming both object-based and spatial attention are independent from each other, it is 
possible that in the double memory task, both the color and location information were 
recoded into a single memory code rather than being maintained as two separate memory 
codes. For example, the memory code could be of an integrated object (e.g., Vogel & Luck, 
1997; Vogel et al., 2001), in which case the number of items held in VSTM would be 
constant across the three memory tasks. However, it must be noted that attentional resources 
are required to bind the color and location information into an integrated object (Wheeler & 
Treisman, 2002). Given that attentional resources were limited in the dual-task condition, it is 
questionable whether such a strategy would be pursued. Furthermore, the independence and 
dissociation of object and spatial STM when employed in a dual-task paradigm has been 
demonstrated in numerous studies in the literature (e.g., Klauer & Zhao, 2004; Logie, 1986; 
Logie et al., 1990; Logie & Marchetti, 1991; Tresch et al., 1993; see Logie, 1995 for a 
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review). These findings cast doubt on the possibility that both color and location information 
were recoded into a single memory code.  
Another way to reconcile the findings with the model is to assume that object and 
spatial STM remain independent from each other while the cognitive components associated 
with spatial and object-based attention interact with each other. In this scenario, the fact that 
spatial attentional shifts within an object were buffered from the loading of spatial STM is an 
indication that these spatial attentional shifts were somehow modulated by the presence of 
the object. There is evidence in the literature that attentional selection of spatial locations 
within an object is facilitated compared to selection of locations outside an object (e.g., 
Brown & Denney, 2007; Müller and Kleinschimdt, 2003). Also, previous studies have 
provided evidence for the interaction of spatial and object-based attention within a single task 
paradigm, by demonstrating that attending to an object alters the spatial gradient of the space 
surrounding the object (Kravitz & Behrmann, 2008), that object-based attention only 
operates within spatially attended regions (Lavie & Driver, 1996), or that attention 
automatically spreads across the spatial regions of an object even though attention was only 
directed to a region of the object  (Davis, Driver, Pavani & Shepherd, 2000). These findings 
suggest that object-based and spatial attentional selection within any single task paradigm are 
not dissociable and independent from each other. This would account for why the attentional 
shifting cost in the different object condition when both object and spatial STM were loaded 
did not increase, because the prediction that a larger attentional shifting cost would be 
observed was built on the assumption that the object-based and spatial attentional shifts were 
independent from each other.  
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If the second interpretation of the results of Experiment 2 were correct, it also would 
have implications for interpreting the results of Experiment 1. One of the purposes for 
conducting Experiment 2 was because the Duncan (1984) object task employed in 
Experiment 1 heavily engaged object STM. Even though interference effects were found in 
both the color and location memory tasks when subjects concurrently performed the Duncan 
object task with separated stimuli, this could be due to the fact that object STM was heavily 
engaged by the Duncan object task, and not because both object-based and spatial attentional 
selection were independently engaged. In other words, if one were to interpret the results of 
Experiment 2 as not supporting the claim of independence and dissociation between the two 
sets of processing resources, it would suggest that the findings in previous studies supporting 
such a claim (Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Tan, 2008) might be the result of a task artifact.  
 The two different interpretations of the numerically larger but not statistically 
different attentional shifting cost in the dual-task condition for the double memory task lead 
to different and contrasting conclusions. The assumption that a real difference was not 
detected because of lack of statistical power leads to the conclusion that the two sets of 
processing resources are independent and dissociable from each other. In contrast, the 
assumption that no real difference exist leads to the conclusion that the two sets of processing 
resources are not independent and dissociable from each other. In order to tease apart the two 
possible interpretations and conclusions, I propose a future study using a similar method as 
Experiment 2 while varying the spatial distance between the two objects in the Egly et al. 
(1994) object task. 
 In this proposed study, there would be a ‘far’ and ‘near’ condition in which the spatial 
distance between the target and cue in the Egly et al. object task is varied. In other words, the 
 112 
length of the rectangle objects in the task would be varied. When this was the case, the cost 
of the spatial attentional shifts also would vary with the distance between the target and the 
cue in the different object condition (e.g., Downing and Pinker, 1995). However, because the 
number of objects still remains the same, the cost of object-based attentional shifts in the 
different object condition should remain the same in both the near and far conditions. On the 
assumption that the two sets of processing resources are independent and dissociable, the 
prediction is that when object STM is loaded, there should be no differences in the attentional 
shifting cost in the dual-task different object condition between the near and far conditions. 
Furthermore, when spatial STM is loaded, the attentional shifting cost in the dual-task 
different object condition should increase with the spatial distance between the target and the 
cue. When both spatial and object STM are loaded, there should be an attentional shifting 
cost in the dual-task different object condition that should be larger than when either only 
spatial STM or only object STM was loaded. The attentional shifting cost also should 
increase with the spatial distance between the target and the cue, and this increase should be 
comparable to the increase observed when only spatial STM was loaded.  
In contrast, on the assumption that spatial and object-based attention interact with 
each other in the context of the Egly et al. (1994) object task, the increase in attentional 
shifting cost in the dual-task different object condition should be similar when either object 
STM or spatial STM is loaded. Furthermore, there should be no increase in the attentional 
shifting cost when both object and spatial STM are loaded in the double memory task. The 
results from this proposed future experiment will provide evidence regarding which of the 
two possible interpretations and conclusions of the results of Experiment 2 in the present 
study is better.  
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Modulation of Spatial Attention Within an Object 
 
 The results in Experiment 2 suggest that the presence of an object facilitates spatial 
attentional shifts within it. Either spatial attention minimally engaged processing resources 
when shifting within an object and hence is not affected by spatial STM engaging the similar 
processing resources, or spatial shifts within an object are buffered from the interfering 
effects of spatial STM because spatial attentional shifts within an object might be different 
from those examined in the typical spatial attention study (Posner & Petersen, 1990).  
 In some studies investigating object-based attention, subjects have to report properties 
located in a single object or multiple objects without being cued to any of the objects (e.g., 
Duncan, 1984; Kramer & Watson, 1997, 1999; Lavie & Driver, 1996; Matsukura & Vecera, 
2006). The general finding in these studies is that subjects usually reported the properties 
better when they were located in the same object. While the spatial location of the properties 
were not controlled in some earlier studies (e.g., Duncan, 1984; Vecera & Farah, 1994), they 
were controlled in later studies such that the spatial distance between the properties was 
similar when they were located in the same or different objects (e.g., Davis, Drive, Pavani & 
Sheppard, 2000; Kramer & Watson, 1997, 1999; Matsukura & Vecera, 2006). If it is 
assumed that accessing the spatial locations of the properties is a prerequisite for reporting 
them, then the findings of these studies imply, but do not directly demonstrate, that accessing 
spatial locations within the same object was different from accessing spatial locations in 
different objects. In these cases, the claim that accessing or processing spatial locations is 
facilitated in the same object was inferred rather than directly demonstrated. 
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Although it was not the main purpose of the study, Kim and Cave (1995) provided 
some direct evidence suggesting that spatial locations are processed differently when they are 
located within objects. However, an ‘object’ in Kim and Cave was not a stimulus defined by 
a common boundary or contour (as in the Egly et al. task), rather it was a set of stimuli 
sharing common features such as shape or color. Kim and Cave asked subjects to search for a 
target in a search array that had items with different shapes and colors. On 25% of the trials, 
the search array was followed by a dot probe (small black dot) appearing in a position 
formerly occupied by a target or a distractor. RT to the dot probe increased as a function of 
the distance of the dot probe from the target, demonstrating the effects of spatial attention. 
However, subjects were faster and more accurate when the dot probe appeared in the position 
of a distractor that shared either the same color or shape as the target than when it appeared 
in the position of a distractor that shared neither feature with the target. These findings were 
replicated in Kim and Cave (2001) using different types of stimuli. These findings showed 
that spatial locations within items in a search array defined by the same features as the search 
target received preferential processing over locations that were outside these items.  
 Müller and Kleinschimdt (2003) provided neurological evidence for the claim that 
spatial locations within an object are processed differently. Subjects were required to perform 
a modified version of the Egly et al. (1994) object task using a central cue, in which the ends 
of the fixation cross (i.e., an ‘X’) lit up to indicate the direction in which the target might 
appear. Using fMRI, activity in the subjects’ early visual cortex was measured while they 
were performing the task. After central cueing, in which attention was directed to a specific 
corner of one of the objects, activity in early visual areas was enhanced not only at 
corresponding retinotopic representations, but also at representations of other locations 
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covered by the object. While activity was greater for representations of cued locations than 
uncued locations on the cued object, higher activation was found in the uncued locations in 
the same object than equidistant locations on the other object when the cue was invalid. 
Müller and Kleinschimdt interpreted their findings as showing an interaction of object-based 
spatial selection with an object-independent spatial mechanism in directing attention. Within 
the context of the present study, the findings of Müller and Kleinschimdt suggest that spatial 
locations within a cued object were different than spatial locations in the uncued object. 
Hence, this might account for why even though spatial STM might be engaged in the location 
memory and double memory tasks, a spatial attentional shifting cost failed to manifest when 
the cue and target appeared in different spatial locations of the same object in the dual-task 
condition. 
 Recently, Kravitz and Behrmann (2008) also demonstrated that a cued object could 
affect the gradient of spatial attention surrounding it. After an object was cued, a target 
would appear in the region surrounding the object. Subjects were faster to respond to targets 
closer to the center of mass of the object than targets further away, even though all targets 
were equidistant from the cue. Furthermore, RT to targets in the surround of a fixed, attended 
object was shown to be a linear function of distance from the center of mass of the object, 
and changes to the shape of the object and its center of mass altered RT. The findings of this 
study provided further evidence that the presence of an object affects the processing and 
attending of spatial locations.  
 In the context of the current study, the studies just described suggest that it might not 
be appropriate to consider the attentional selection of spatial locations within an object as 
similar to the attentional selection of spatial locations that are not within the same object. In 
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other words, the spatial attentional shifts within the same object for the Egly et al. object task 
in Experiment 2 might not be comparable to the typical spatial attentional shift (e.g., Posner 
et al., 1980; Posner & Petersen, 1990). In fact, one could make the argument that the findings 
of Müller and Kleinschimdt (2003) show that little or no attentional selection is required for 
spatial locations within an object once the object had already been attended (selected). This 
would account for the results in Experiment 2, in which no attentional shifting cost was 
found for the dual-task condition when the target and cue were in the same object. If one only 
considered the attentional shifting costs for the dual-task condition when the target and cue 
were in different objects, this would fit with the model in Figure 1 (page 28). In other words, 
the fact that no attentional shifting cost was found for the dual-task condition when the target 
and cue were in the same object and when spatial or both spatial and object STM were 
loaded does not necessarily rule out the claim that the set of processing resources required for 
spatial attention and spatial STM and the set required for object-based attention and object 
STM are dissociable from each other.  
 The discussion thus far has been that selection of locations within an object does not 
require the same spatial attention resources as selection of location between objects. If the 
claim is generalized to locations within or outside of the current selected object, then a 
further prediction is that loading spatial STM should interfere with shifting attention to any 
spatial locations outside an attended or cued object, even if the location is not in itself in 
another object. To investigate this claim, I propose a future study using a similar dual-task 
paradigm as in Experiment 2, but with the attention task adopted from Brown and Denney 
(2007). In order to investigate the process of attentional shifting underlying object-based and 
spatial attention, Brown and Denney modified the Egly et al. (1994) object task such that 
 117 
there was only one object in the visual display. By cueing spatial locations inside and outside 
of the object and presenting the target in an uncued location, four different types of 
attentional shifts could be identified, namely (a) location to location shifts within the object, 
(b) location to location shifts not within the object, (c) shifting from a location within the 
object to a location outside the object, and (d) shifting from a location outside the object to a 
location within the object. In my proposed study, either object or spatial STM would be 
loaded while subjects performed the modified Egly et al. object task with only a single 
object. The result would show whether an attentional spatial shift within an object and one 
that is not within an object are affected differently by loading spatial or object STM. 
Specifically, examining the increase in attentional shifting cost when either object or spatial 
STM is loaded for conditions (a) and (c) would allow an answer to the question about 
whether the failure to find an increase in the attentional shiftng cost for the same object 
condition in Experiment 2 was due to the fact that spatial attentional shifts within an object 
are different from a shift to a location outside an object.  
 
Locus of Interference  
 
 The locus of interference in the dual-task condition was different in the two 
experiments. Although there was a general overall decrement in performance in both the 
attention and memory tasks in the dual-task condition for both experiments, the selective 
interference of VSTM and attention components engaging similar processing resources was 
manifest in different tasks over the two experiments. In Experiment 1, attention tasks 
engaging similar processing resources impaired performance in the memory tasks. In 
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Experiment 2, attention task performance was impaired when VSTM engaging similar 
processing resources was loaded.  
 While the factors that determine the locus of interference in the dual-task condition 
are likely multi-faceted, one likely factor is whether the attention task was speeded. Using 
both a modified speeded version of the Duncan object task and an unspeeded version of the 
original Duncan (1984) object task, Tan (2008) observed no effect on the Duncan object task 
with an unspeeded response of loading spatial versus object STM, but there was a difference 
when the response was speeded. The reverse was found in the performance of the memory 
tasks. Accuracy varied as a function of VSTM type when the Duncan object task was 
unspeeded, but no differences were found when it was speeded. Matsukura and Vecera 
(2008) also demonstrated no difference in performance in the unspeeded Duncan object task 
when different VSTM types were loaded. These findings suggest that the nature of response 
in the Duncan object task (i.e., speeded or unspeeded) is an important factor in determining 
the locus of interference in the dual-task condition. 
 There are several possible explanations for the influence of response speed on the 
locus of interference in the dual-task condition. In the speeded version of the Duncan (1984) 
object task, subjects are told to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to the 
stimuli, which places an implicit emphasis on speed and may increase the likelihood of 
interference on the task when processing resources are limited. In contrast, subjects make 
two responses without any time constraints for the unspeeded version of the Duncan object 
task. Hence, there is less emphasis on speed and it is less likely for the task to show 
interference even though processing resources are limited. Furthermore, because subjects in 
the unspeeded Duncan object task are required to make two responses, information must be 
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held in VSTM for a longer time, allowing decay, and there may be response interference 
from two responses rather than one. Thus, the decay or interference of information in VSTM 
is likely to be more severe in the unspeeded Duncan object task, especially if similar 
resources are engaged.  
 While the speeded nature of the Duncan object task provides a possible explanation 
for the locus of interference in the dual-task condition, this explanation is unlikely to be the 
sole explanation. This is because the results from the visual search tasks are incongruent with 
an account in which speeded responses lead to interference on the attention task rather than 
the VSTM task. In the visual search task employed in the current and also previous studies 
(Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004), subjects are 
required to make a single speeded response. If the speeded nature of the task were the only 
factor influencing the locus of interference, then in the dual-task condition, selective 
impairment of performance due to engaging similar processing resources should occur in the 
visual search task and not the memory task. However, the data in the current study showed 
the opposite pattern. While there was sometimes an increase in the overall RT in the dual-
task condition when spatial STM was loaded (i.e., with the location memory task), search 
slopes did not increase in the dual-task condition. Because loading spatial STM did not 
increase the difficulty of target search, the speeded nature of the response cannot be the sole 
explanation for the differences between Experiments 1 and 2 in locus of interference in the 
dual-task paradigm. 
 The findings from previous studies using the visual search task have been mixed, 
suggesting that the locus of interference is unlikely to be explained by a single factor and is 
likely to be caused by a combination of several factors. While Oh and Kim (2004) and 
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Woodman and Luck (2004) both found an interference effect of loading spatial STM on both 
the attention and memory tasks, in that search slopes were increased and memory 
performance was decreased, Matsukura and Vecera (2008) and the present study found an 
interference effect in the memory task but not the attention task. In other words, search 
slopes did not increase when spatial STM was loaded, but location memory performance was 
impaired as a function of spatial attention engagement.  One factor that could be contributing 
to the inconsistencies in the visual search task is the presentation of the stimuli. In the studies 
that found an interference effect (Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004), the 
presentation of the search items was less constrained than in the present study and Matsukura 
and Vecera (2008), in which no interference effect was found. In the former studies, search 
items were randomly arranged in three of four quadrants on the screen, while in the latter 
studies, search items were arranged in a circular pattern similar to the face of a clock. When 
the arrangement of the search items is constrained, subjects might be able to develop search 
strategies and this might lessen the possible interference effects on the visual search task. In 
contrast, when the arrangement of search items is less constrained, subjects may need to 
engage more spatial attention in order to find the target. Hence, this might increase the 
possibility of interference on the visual search task when spatial STM is loaded at the same 
time.  
 As the focus of the present study was not on the locus of interference in the dual-task 
paradigm, it must be noted that these claims must are simply educated conjectures rather than 
empirically supported assertions. While the general conclusions of the present study are not 
affected by the difference in the locus of interference between the two experiments, the 
factors affecting the locus of interference in the dual-task paradigm remain a theoretically 
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interesting area for further research. A systematic investigation into this topic might provide 
a better understanding of the cognitive processes involved when two or more cognitive 
components compete for the same set of processing resources. Although the present study 
was not designed to investigate this question, the finding that the locus of interference might 
be affected by characteristics associated with the task provides a possible platform from 
which further research could be launched.  
 
Visual Short-Term Memory or Working Memory? 
 
 The memory tasks employed in both Experiments 1 and 2 involved the simple 
maintenance of visual information without any form of manipulation. According to Mohr and 
Linden (2005), the maintenance of visual information is distinct from the manipulation of 
visual information, in that the former does not require engaging resources associated with the 
central executive (Baddeley, 1986, 1996). Because attention tasks are assumed to engage 
central executive resources, one should not expect to find any interference in the memory or 
attention tasks in the present study according to the claims of Mohr and Linden. However, 
this was not the case as interference effects were observed for both the memory tasks 
(Experiment 1) and the attention tasks (Experiment 2). The findings in the present study, 
together with similar findings in previous studies (e.g., Matsukura & Vecera, 2008; Oh & 
Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004), are inconsistent with the claims of Mohr and Linden.  
 Mohr and Linden (2005) based their claims on the finding that when subjects were 
asked to perform a random number generation task concurrently with either a visual 
maintenance task or a visual manipulation task, the random number generation task 
 122 
interfered with the latter but not with the former. The random number generation task was 
assumed to engage central executive resources, the visual maintenance task was assumed to 
engage VSTM, and the visual manipulation task was assumed to engage WM. In the random 
number generation task, subjects were required to generate numbers randomly by vocalizing 
the numbers. Hence, it was not a visual task by nature and required little or no visual 
resources.  This could account for why an interference effect occurred in the present study 
and not in Mohr and Linden (2005).  
 However, the claim that no interference effect was found in Mohr and Linden (2005) 
because of the non-visual nature of the random number generation task raises more questions 
than answers. In the WM model proposed by Baddeley (1986; 1996) and adopted in both the 
present study and Mohr and Linden, it is assumed that the central executive is not involved in 
information maintenance, but rather it is involved in processes such as executive control, 
selection of task relevant information and the activation of long-term memory. The slave 
systems (i.e., visuo-spatial sketchpad, phonological loop) are responsible for the maintenance 
of information. Hence, the fact that the attention task interfered with the memory task in 
Experiment 1 and that the reverse occurred in Experiment 2, suggests that the simple 
maintenance of visual information requires central executive resources. This is at odds with 
the WM model proposed by Baddeley.  
 One possibility for this apparent inconsistency is that most of the tasks used to 
investigate the central executive or the visuo-spatial sketchpad (see Baddeley, 1986; Logie, 
1995, for reviews), including the random number generation task used by Mohr and Linden 
(2005), are not tasks that emphasize attentional selection of task relevant information 
(Baddeley, 1996). Instead, most of the tasks employed to investigate the central executive 
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involve attentional control, in which subjects are required to switch between several tasks, or 
the online manipulation of visual information, in which subjects are required to transform or 
recode the information in STM (Baddeley, 1996). It may be that attentional selection and the 
maintenance of visual information in STM engage similar processing resources in the central 
executive and that these are different from the resources required for attentional control or 
the online manipulation of visual information. Thus, the claim that the maintenance of visual 
information in VSTM does not engage central executive processing resources (Mohr and 
Linden, 2005) might be inaccurate.  
Two possibilities can account for both the findings of Mohr and Linden (2005) and 
the present study. The first possibility is that the central executive resources engaged by 
maintaining visual information in VSTM could be specific for visual stimuli. Hence, the 
random number generation task, a non-visual task, is unlikely to compete for the same set of 
central executive resources and would not lead to interference. However, it must be noted 
that this account implies that the central executive is sensitive to stimulus modality, which is 
at odds with Baddeley’s (1986) model of WM. The second possibility is that maintaining 
visual information in VSTM engages minimal central executive resources rather than no 
central executive resources. If an attention task emphasizing selection required more central 
executive resources than the random number generation task, which emphasizes control, then 
the difference is accounted for. The non-interference in Mohr and Linden and the 
interference in the present study are due to the amount of central executive resources required 
by the attention task, suggesting that the engagement of central executive resources is not an 
all-or-none process.  
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 Although the present study was not specifically designed to investigate the central 
executive in the Baddeley (1986, 1996) WM model, the findings in the present study raise 
several interesting questions about the interaction of the central executive with the visuo-
spatial sketchpad. One conclusion that could be drawn from the present study is that the 
separation between the central executive and the slave systems might not be as distinct and as 
clear as Baddeley has claimed.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 The present study investigated the relationship between the different types of visual 
attention and VSTM. Limited empirical support was provided for the claims that: (a) spatial 
attention and spatial STM engage similar processing resources, (b) object-based attention and 
object STM engage similar processing resources, and (c) these two sets of processing 
resources are dissociable from each other. While the results from Experiment 1 provided 
support for the above claims, the results from Experiment 2 suggested that the results in 
Experiment 1 that provided support for the above claims might be due to a task artifact in 
that the object attention task in Experiment 1 may have required object STM. However, as a 
portion of results in Experiment 2 was ambiguous and open to at least two different 
interpretations, two further experiments for future research were proposed.  
 Although the results in Experiment 2 did not allow a clear interpretation, the mixed 
nature of the findings highlights the fact that the relationship between visual attention and 
visual STM is complex. Highlighting of the complexity is an important contribution. The 
extant claim in the literature that object-based attention and object STM engage similar 
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processing resources was established with limited empirical support (Matsukura & Vecera, 
2008; Tan, 2008). Although this claim was further substantiated in Experiment 1 by the 
pattern of differences across the memory tasks produced by the Duncan object task with 
separated stimuli (e.g., Vecera & Farah, 1994) and by differences in the Egly et al. (1994) 
object task produced by the color memory task in Experiment 2, the results from the location 
and double memory task conditions in Experiment 2 suggest that the claim that the set of 
processing resources engaged by object-based attention and object STM is dissociable from 
the set of processing resources engaged by spatial attention and spatial STM may not be 
accurate. Although the nature of the overlap may not be clear, identification that there may 
be overlap contributes further to the understanding of the interaction between visual attention 
and VSTM. 
 Based on the findings in the present study and also previous studies (see the earlier 
sections entitled ‘Dissociable Sets of Processing Resources?’ and ‘Modulation of Spatial 
Attention Within an Object’), one could reject the model shown in Figure 1 (page 28) 
depicting the relationship between visual attention and VSTM. A more plausible model, 
given the current results, depicting the relationship between visual attention and VSTM is 
shown in Figure 18. In this model, the two sets of processing resources are dissociable when 
the different types of VSTM (i.e., object STM and spatial STM) are engaged. However, 
when both object-based attention and spatial attention are engaged, the model shows that 
they engage similar processing resources, at least under certain circumstances (e.g., in the 
Egly et al. object task).  However, it must be noted that this model is highly speculative and 
more research is required to further test this model. 
 
 126 
 
Figure 18. Revised proposed relationship between visual attention and VSTM based on  
      the findings in the present study. It is proposed that while spatial STM and  
      object STM are dissociable from each other, there is probably some overlap in  
      the processing resources engaged by spatial attention and object-based  
      attention.  
 
 
 
The present study raises several other interesting questions. For example, the results 
of the present study suggest that the locus of interference in a dual-task paradigm is due to 
factors such as the speeded nature of the task and how stimuli are presented. This might be an 
area for further research because it could be informative about circumstances under which 
different cognitive components compete for similar processing resources. This knowledge 
would be particularly useful in an applied setting where the operator needs to select task 
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relevant information over task irrelevant information for further processing while 
maintaining visual information at the same time.  
 Another theoretical question raised by the present study is whether VSTM engages 
the central executive. The findings in the present study, together with those of Matsukura and 
Vecera (2008), Oh and Kim (2004) and Woodman and Luck (2004), suggest that maintaining 
visual information in VSTM requires central executive resources. The findings also suggest 
that the separation between the central executive and the visuo-spatial sketchpad in the 
Baddeley (1986) WM model might not be as distinct and clear as previously claimed, 
although further research would be required to establish this claim.  
 In conclusion, the findings in the present study provide a further understanding of the 
workings of both visual attention and VSTM. While issues to be resolved still remain, such 
as investigating the difference in the interference effect of spatial STM on spatial attentional 
shifts within an object and spatial attentional shifts not within an object, the findings in the 
present study contribute significantly to the literature on visual attention and VSTM.  
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APPENDIX A: COMPLETE REPORT OF STATISTICAL TESTS 
 
 
 
Table A. Statistical Tests of Visual Search Task (Mean Accuracy) 
 
Memory Type Effect df F ratio p value 
Task (1, 29) 0.453 0.5 
Set Size (1, 29) 2.22 0.14 
Target (1, 29) 12.08 0.002 
Task  x Set Size (1, 29) 0.326 0.57 
Task x Target (1, 29) 0.925 0.34 
Set Size x Target (1, 29) 2.75 0.1 
Task x Set Size x Target (1, 29) 1.04 0.31 
Color 
        
Task (1, 29) 0.138 0.71 
Set Size (1, 29) 0.892 0.35 
Target (1, 29) 9.98 0.004 
Task  x Set Size (1, 29) 0.105 0.74 
Task x Target (1, 29) 0.708 0.4 
Set Size x Target (1, 29) 1.89 0.18 
Task x Set Size x Target (1, 29) 1.75 0.19 
Location 
        
Task (1, 29) 0.38 0.54 
Set Size (1, 29) 14.76 0.001 
Target (1, 29) 10.61 0.003 
Task  x Set Size (1, 29) 0.416 0.52 
Task x Target (1, 29) 0.528 0.47 
Set Size x Target (1, 29) 2.27 0.14 
Task x Set Size x Target (1, 29) 0.042 0.83 
Double 
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Table B. Statistical Tests of Visual Search Task (RT) 
 
Memory Type Effect df F ratio p value 
Task (1, 29) 1.46 0.23 
Set Size (1, 29) 185.64 0.001 
Target (1, 29) 114.03 0.001 
Task  x Set Size (1, 29) 0.378 0.54 
Task x Target (1, 29) 0.74 0.39 
Set Size x Target (1, 29) 73.67 0.001 
Task x Set Size x Target (1, 29) 0.622 0.43 
Color 
        
Task (1, 29) 8.31 0.007 
Set Size (1, 29) 212.97 0.001 
Target (1, 29) 117.33 0.001 
Task  x Set Size (1, 29) 1.02 0.321 
Task x Target (1, 29) 0.602 0.44 
Set Size x Target (1, 29) 72.11 0.001 
Task x Set Size x Target (1, 29) 0.517 0.47 
Location 
        
Task (1, 29) 1.95 0.17 
Set Size (1, 29) 203.78 0.001 
Target (1, 29) 91.78 0.001 
Task  x Set Size (1, 29) 4.6 0.04 
Task x Target (1, 29) 0.049 0.82 
Set Size x Target (1, 29) 106.36 0.001 
Task x Set Size x Target (1, 29) 0.261 0.61 
Double 
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Table C. Statistical Tests of Duncan Object Task, Overlap (Mean Accuracy) 
 
Memory Type Effect df F ratio p value 
Task (1, 29) 34.09 0.001 
Object (1, 29) 29.47 0.001 
Report (1, 29) 0.402 0.53 
Task  x Object (1, 29) 0.005 0.94 
Task x  Report (1, 29) 0.166 0.68 
Object x Report (1, 29) 3.56 0.07 
Task x Object x Report (1, 29) 0.135 0.71 
Color 
        
Task (1, 29) 27.92 0.001 
Object (1, 29) 22.24 0.001 
Report (1, 29) 0.45 0.51 
Task  x Object (1, 29) 0.671 0.41 
Task x  Report (1, 29) 0.944 0.33 
Object x Report (1, 29) 0.632 0.43 
Task x Object x Report (1, 29) 0.536 0.47 
Location 
        
Task (1, 29) 43.5 0.001 
Object (1, 29) 25.4 0.001 
Report (1, 29) 0.581 0.45 
Task  x Object (1, 29) 0.05 0.82 
Task x  Report (1, 29) 0.083 0.77 
Object x Report (1, 29) 0.645 0.42 
Task x Object x Report (1, 29) 0.161 0.69 
Double 
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Table D. Statistical Tests of Duncan Object Task, Separate (Mean Accuracy) 
 
Memory Type Effect df F ratio p value 
Task (1, 29) 58.87 0.001 
Object (1, 29) 67.44 0.001 
Report (1, 29) 0.038 0.84 
Task  x Object (1, 29) 0.066 0.79 
Task x  Report (1, 29) 1.002 0.32 
Object x Report (1, 29) 4.53 0.04 
Task x Object x Report (1, 29) 0.003 0.95 
Color 
        
Task (1, 29) 33.55 0.001 
Object (1, 29) 68.39 0.001 
Report (1, 29) 0.228 0.63 
Task  x Object (1, 29) 0.375 0.54 
Task x  Report (1, 29) 0.043 0.83 
Object x Report (1, 29) 0.006 0.93 
Task x Object x Report (1, 29) 0.606 0.44 
Location 
        
Task (1, 29) 45.17 0.001 
Object (1, 29) 195.35 0.001 
Report (1, 29) 1.12 0.29 
Task  x Object (1, 29) 0.795 0.38 
Task x  Report (1, 29) 6.56 0.016 
Object x Report (1, 29) 9.41 0.005 
Task x Object x Report (1, 29) 4.03 0.054 
Double 
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Table E. Statistical Tests of Egly et al. Object Task (Mean Accuracy) 
 
Memory Type Effect df F ratio p value 
Task (1, 47) 0.062 0.8 
Cue (2. 94) 13.13 0.001 
Task x Cue (2. 94) 1.21 0.3 
Color 
        
Task (1, 47) 4.36 0.042 
Cue (2. 94) 7.97 0.001 
Task x Cue (2. 94) 0.25 0.77 
Location 
        
Task (1, 47) 5.44 0.024 
Cue (2. 94) 9.14 0.001 
Task x Cue (2. 94) 0.97 0.38 
Double 
        
 
 
Table F. Statistical Tests of Egly et al. Object Task (RT) 
 
Memory Type Effect df F ratio p value 
Task (1, 47) 15.36 0.001 
Cue (2. 94) 102.7 0.001 
Task x Cue (2. 94) 3.55 0.033 
Color 
        
Task (1, 47) 47.45 0.001 
Cue (2. 94) 130.31 0.001 
Task x Cue (2. 94) 3.06 0.052 
Location 
        
Task (1, 47) 27.75 0.001 
Cue (2. 94) 101.57 0.001 
Task x Cue (2. 94) 10.44 0.001 
Double 
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APPENDIX B: COMPLETE REPORT OF TASK PERFORMANCE IN 
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
 
Table A. Mean Accuracy in Visual Search Taska 
 
 Baseline 
 Set 4 Set 12 
 Present Absent Present Absent 
Color 0.95 (0.06) 0.96 (0.07) 0.92 (0.09) 0.06 (0.09) 
Location 0.96 (0.06) 0.97 (0.07) 0.94 (0.12) 0.98 (0.05) 
Double 0.95 (0.07) 0.98 (0.05) 0.91 (0.10) 0.96 (0.05) 
 
 Dual Task 
 Set 4 Set 12 
 Present Absent Present Absent 
Color 0.95 (0.08) 0.98 (0.05) 0.93 (0.09) 0.98 (0.04) 
Location 0.95 (0.09) 0.98 (0.03) 0.93 (0.12) 0.97 (0.05) 
Double 0.97 (0.06) 0.98 (0.03) 0.92 (0.10) 0.96 (0.09) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
 
Table B. Mean RT in Visual Search Taska 
 
 Baseline 
 Set 4 Set 12 
 Present Absent Present Absent 
Color 
1036 
(323) 
1315 
(372) 
1410 
(330) 
2211 
(574) 
Location 
1070 
(230) 
1295 
(296) 
1507 
(323) 
2319 
(595) 
Double 
1061 
(226) 
1243 
(247) 
1476 
(359) 
2238 
(595) 
 
 Dual Task 
 Set 4 Set 12 
 Present Absent Present Absent 
Color 
1068 
(262) 
1349 
(328) 
1439 
(290) 
2297 
(585) 
Location 
1211 
(287) 
1443 
(381) 
1578 
(302) 
2445 
(540) 
Double 
1189 
(216) 
1359 
(268) 
1495 
(372) 
2285 
(568) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
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Table C. Mean Accuracy in Memory Task in the Visual Search Task Combinationsa  
 
 Double 
 
Color Location 
Color Location 
Baseline 
0.94 
(0.06) 
0.92 
(0.06) 
0.93 
(0.10) 
0.91 
(0.09) 
Dual: Set 4 
0.88 
(0.09) 
0.88 
(0.08) 
0.89 
(0.11) 
0.88 
(0.09) 
Dual: Set 12 
0.88 
(0.09) 
0.82 
(0.11) 
0.88 
(0.08) 
0.80 
(0.13) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D. Mean Accuracy For Duncan Object Task (Overlap)a 
 
 Baseline 
 Same Object Different Object 
 
Color 0.91 (0.07) 0.87 (0.09) 
Location 0.91 (0.09) 0.87 (0.11) 
Double 0.93 (0.09) 0.90 (0.09) 
 
 Dual Task 
 Same Object Different Object 
 
Color 0.85 (0.11) 0.82 (0.11) 
Location 0.84 (0.11) 0.81 (0.13) 
Double 0.87 (0.10) 0.83 (0.11) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
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Table E. Mean Accuracy in Memory Task in the Duncan Object Task (Overlap)  
          Combinationsa  
 
 
 
Color Location 
Baseline 0.89 (0.07) 0.85 (0.11) 
Dual: Same 0.81 (0.08) 0.78 (0.09) 
Dual: Different 0.76 (0.11) 0.77 (0.10) 
  
 Double 
 Color Location 
Baseline 0.90 (0.14) 0.90 (0.09) 
Dual: Same 0.82 (0.11) 0.80 (0.09) 
Dual: Different 0.74 (0.12) 0.80 (0.10) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F. Mean Accuracy For Duncan Object Task (Separate)a  
 
 Baseline Dual Task 
 Same Object Different Object Same Object Different Object 
   
Color 0.92 (0.09) 0.83 (0.10) 0.85 (0.10) 0.76 (0.11) 
Location 0.90 (0.09) 0.82 (0.08) 0.84 (0.11) 0.75 (0.11) 
Double 0.92 (0.09) 0.82 (0.11) 0.88 (0.11) 0.77 (0.11) 
   
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
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Table G. Mean Accuracy in Memory Task in the Duncan Object Task (Separate)  
          Combinationsa  
 
 
 
Color Location 
Baseline 0.90 (0.09) 0.88 (0.11) 
Dual: Same 0.83 (0.11) 0.79 (0.08) 
Dual: Different 0.78 (0.11) 0.74 (0.11) 
 
 Double 
 Color Location 
Baseline 0.87 (0.12) 0.86 (0.14) 
Dual: Same 0.77 (0.13) 0.75 (0.13) 
Dual: Different 0.69 (0.13) 0.69 (0.16) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table H. Mean Accuracy of Egly Object Taska 
 
 Baseline Dual Task  
 Valid 
Invalid 
(Same) 
Invalid 
(Diff) Valid 
Invalid 
(Same) 
Invalid 
(Diff) 
Color 
0.93 
(0.08) 
0.89 
(0.09) 
0.89 
(0.09) 
0.92 
(0.06) 
0.90 
(0.09) 
0.89 
(0.09) 
Location 
0.89 
(0.09) 
0.86 
(0.11) 
0.86 
(0.11) 
0.91 
(0.07) 
0.88 
(0.11) 
0.89 
(0.08) 
Double 
0.90 
(0.06) 
0.87 
(0.09) 
0.88 
(0.08) 
0.93 
(0.05) 
0.90 
(0.08) 
0.89 
(0.06) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
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Table I. Mean RT of Egly Object Taska 
 
 Baseline Dual Task  
 Valid 
Invalid 
(Same) 
Invalid 
(Diff) Valid 
Invalid 
(Same) 
Invalid 
(Diff) 
Color 
642 
(162) 
714 
(153) 
739 
(170) 
901 
(144) 
778 
(146) 
828 
(162) 
Location 
709 
(139) 
784 
(143) 
808 
(145) 
823 
(163) 
897 
(186) 
949 
(197) 
Double 
682 
(138) 
761 
(142) 
779 
(148) 
782 
(164) 
860 
(155) 
928 
(199) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
 
 
 
 
Table J. Mean Attention Shifting Cost of Egly Object Taska 
 
 Baseline Dual Task  
 Same Obj Different Obj Same Obj Different Obj 
Color 72 (79) 97 (87) 77 (58) 127 (62) 
Location 74 (60) 99 (55) 74 (75) 126 (81) 
Double 78 (73) 97 (78) 77 (69) 145 (86) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
 
 
 
 
Table K. Mean Accuracy of Memory Task in the Egly Object Task Combinationsa 
 
  Double 
  
Color Location 
Color Location 
Baseline 0.89 (0.08) 0.91 (0.08) 0.83 (0.13) 0.86 (0.13) 
Dual: Valid 0.80 (0.09) 0.83 (0.09) 0.78 (0.12) 0.81 (0.15) 
Dual: Invalid Same 0.79 (0.13) 0.81 (0.13) 0.78 (0.14) 0.80 (0.16) 
Dual Invalid Diff 0.82 (0.10) 0.81 (0.12) 0.78 (0.12) 0.78 (0.17) 
a. standard deviation denoted in parenthesis  
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